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ABSTRACT

Despite a spate of research discussing the importance of media in national politics, as
well as the importance of state legislatures, we know virtually nothing about how
media and state legislatures work in tandem. Using a survey of state legislators in
California, Georgia and Iowa, I ask a number of questions regarding this relationship.
Among my findings, I conclude that state legislators do use media tactics for a variety
of purposes, although traditional means of legislating still prevail. Next, moving
from Susan Herbst's (1998) finding that state legislators often use media content as a
surrogate for public opinion, I examine the ways in which state legislators consume
media. Here, I find that they consume media from their district more often than
media from other places. Certainly this has important implications for the changing
nature of representation in the state legislature. Most importantly, I find most state
legislators feel similarly about the usefulness of using media tactics, but they vary
considerably in how often they use those tactics. This variation appears to be a result
of the resources afforded the legislator, rather than personal or district factors. In the
end, I make a number of suggestions for future research in this understudied, but
vitally important area of study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTIONS, THE DATA AND THE
OUTLINE

More than two decades ago, Richard Fenno posited that legislators have three goals:
reelection, power inside the legislature and good policy (Fenno 1978). The central
assumption of this dissertation is that in order to attain these three goals, legislators
must communicate with a variety of audiences. Obviously, in order to be reelected,
they must communicate with constituents. In order to gain power inside the
legislature and pass good policy, they must communicate with a variety of political
elites, including other legislators and organized interests. Since legislators often do
not have the time to directly communicate with every important actor in the process
they often instead focus on another low cost, high yield way of communicatingseeking and using media coverage (Cook 1989).
Unfortunately, while political scientists have long studied the media's impact
on elections and voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1956), and how federal
politicians use the media (Cook 1989; Cook 1998; Hess 1984; Hess 1986; Matthews
1960) a disconcerting lack of attention has been devoted to understanding how
politicians and the media interact in the states. Despite anecdotal evidence that media
have a direct impact on the day-to-day operation of state and local politics, very few
political scientists have systematically examined this vital political dynamic (Lynch
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1999). This study begins to fill this gap in the literature by examining how state
legislators use the media to communicate with a variety of audiences.
Before continuing, I ask: why this topic? What can we learn? After this, I
briefly discuss what we know about the relationship between state legislatures and the
media. Next, I offer the central research questions of this study along with the
hypotheses that guide them. Next, I review the data used to answer the research
questions. Finally, this chapter concludes with a glimpse of what is to come in each
chapter.
Why State Legislators and the Media?
Most of what we know about legislative behavior is based on the United States
Congress. Although we have gained many insights from this literature, these insights
are subject to one inherent problem. They apply to only one body-the United States
Congress. As Malcolm Jewell once remarked, "The goal of political scientists is to
develop generalizations that are not limited to particular times and places"
(Jewell 1982: 4). Keeping this goal in mind, state legislatures provide one venue to
test theories of legislative behavior that are not bound to a single institution. State
legislatures represent 50 different "laboratories of democracy" where theories and
hypotheses can be tested. This allows the researcher to see how findings vary as to
any number of factors, including: region, culture, and institutional capacity.
The study of state legislatures is not only advantageous from a theoretical
perspective, but also has significant real-world implications. In the last 20 years,
politicians have placed more power in the hands of the states (Stein 1999; Van Hom
2

1996). Indeed, "Power is shifting from Washington to the states, and the states have
developed an enhanced institutional capacity to deal with their new responsibilities"
(Weber and Brace 1999: 11). Known as devolution, this power shift is meant to
"enhance the responsiveness and efficiency of the federal system, based on the theory
that state and local governments can do a better job of providing services for citizens"
(Watson and Gold 1997:1). A recent example of devolution can be found in the
Personal Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. This act shifted
responsibility for the support of low-income families from the federal government to
state governments. Obviously, devolution has increased the power of state legislators
across the country. Although Americans know little about their state legislators
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), their power and influence is considerable.
Understanding the behavior of state legislators is central to understanding American
politics.
I have established that state legislators are important actors to study for a
number of theoretical and practical reasons. Nonetheless, the question remains, why
study their interactions with the media? Certainly, there are many aspects of
legislative behavior worth studying. Why choose this one? First, media are
important in American politics. Although it took political scientists a while to
recognize this, media are an important means through which politicians communicate
with their constituents. Media are also the primary means through which citizens
learn about the political world. Certainly, this dynamic deserves to be studied.
Second, no one has looked at the media's relationship to state legislatures. Despite
3

recent attention to the media's role in Congress (Cook 1989; Cook 1998; Hess 1985;
Hess 1986, Kedrowski 1996), no one has examined how state legislators use the
media to complete their jobs.
Combining these two important but understudied aspects of American politics
should provide an interesting and salient study in American politics. Although the
lack of previous research in the area makes the task somewhat daunting, whatever
conclusions are drawn from this study will provide a marked improvement in our
knowledge of both state legislatures and the media.
Media- A Short Definition

Before continuing, I should stop and define exactly what I mean by "media." I define
media as any means of mass communication-whether television, newspaper,
magazine, Internet, radio, or e-mail. While in certain sections, I may discuss a
particular medium; I am concerned with all forms of media in this dissertation-not
just television or newspapers. Indeed, one purpose of this dissertation is to compare
how different media vary in their use by state legislators.
What We Know About State Politics and the Media

The received wisdom suggests that media have always been important to state and
local politicians. More than 30 years ago, Delmar Dunn noted that "Public officials
often begin their days by examining the local newspaper for stories about themselves
and other officials and agencies, 'combing it daily for messages about their work"'
(quoted in Kaniss 1991: 160). Members who wish to legislate successfully must
work hard to develop a good relationship with the media. State Legislatures
4

magazine recently listed "working with the media" as one of the 15 most important
tips for being an effective state legislator. The magazine urged state legislators to "be
aggressive. Call reporters regularly ... know your local newspapers' deadlines. Call
writers back promptly" (15 tips 2000). Despite a dearth of empirical evidence,
anecdotal evidence suggests that state and local government officials recognize the
importance of the media for their success both electorally and in the policy arena.
So just how much media coverage do state officials receive? The short
answer is: not much. Even in print media, which are traditionally more influential in
the state legislature, the situation seems to be getting worse. The size of capital press
corps is declining as editors move statehouse reporters to other assignments that they
consider more profitable (Layton and Walton 1998)1. One analyst notes, "Many
editors today just don't give a hoot about legislative reporting" (Boulard 2000: 11).
According to professor of journalism Gene Roberts:
We were amazed to discover just how many editors today are philosophically
opposed to governmental coverage in general. It is just in the air. Some
newspaper companies and editors even go as far as to simply believe that state
government and all government news is a big tum-off to readers, so they want
to stay out of it" (Boulard 2000: 12).
When state government is covered, it tends to be covered by central city news outlets.
Coverage declines precipitously as one moves into rural markets (Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1997; Kaniss 1991).
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While media coverage of state politics in general is poor, coverage does vary
slightly depending on the medium. Print media cover state politics more often
(Gormley 1979) and with more detail and quality than broadcast media (Graber
1989a). For example, on national television, state government news constitutes less
than 1.5% of all nightly news stories (Graber 1993a). When broadcast media do
cover state politics, the coverage is often trifling. As with other stories covered by
broadcast media, the visual, the personal, and the simplistic are emphasized. Stories
that require background and context are pushed to the ends of the broadcasts or not
aired at all (Graber 1989a; Graber 1993b; Kaniss 1991).
In the end, news on state politics often ignores important issues. Moreover,
the legislature is virtually ignored, as media focus on stories with more dramatic
pictorial value (Littlewood 1972). Doris Graber has gone so far as to call state news
the "neglected step-child" of governmental affairs. She labels state news "a double
loser" (1989b), noting that "swiss cheese has more substance than holes while the
reverse is true for the press" ( 1993b: 19). While few would be surprised at the lack of
quality news coverage of the states, what is surprising is that television stations that
devote substantial time to state government news fare no worse in ratings than
competing stations that ignore such news (Gormley 1978).
While a few studies have examined the role of the media in gubernatorial
elections (Rozell 1991; Rozell and Wilson 1996), or the relationship between the
governor and the media more generally (Beyle 1978), only one recent study has

1 Although

statehouse reporting is down over time, 24 states rebounded in 1999 (Allan and O'Brien

6

looked systematically at the relationship between state legislators and the media.
Lynch (1999) discovered that state legislative leaders do, in fact, understand the
importance and salience of the media in state politics. He also finds that legislators
rank newspapers and wire services as more important than their national counterparts.
The lack of attention to this subject is particularly surprising considering
frequent calls for directed research in the study of state legislatures. Malcolm Jewell
has twice called for bridging the gap between research on congressional and research
on state legislative research (1976; 1981). Despite the increasing importance of the
media in American politics, no call for research in state legislatures or state politics
has suggested addressing the media-state legislature relationship (Brace and Jewitt
1995; Jewell 1976; Jewell 1981; Jewell 1982).
As I suggested before, very little is known about media coverage of state
government. What little is known suggests that the media do a fairly poor job of
covering state government and politics. In the next section, I detail what more we
questions we will answer about the media and state politics in this dissertation.
What This Study Examines

Because we know virtually nothing about the role of the media in state politics, this
study is primarily descriptive. While I seek to provide a broad framework for
understanding the role of the media in the state legislature, what I develop certainly
does not qualify as a theory. Likewise, I do not seek to test any specific theory of
media politics, as there are none. While the lack of a strong theory to be tested is a

1999)
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limitation of this study, it is does not imply that what follows is unimportant. Indeed,
description can be a vitally important and necessary step on the way to theory
development. As Dubin states:
Description ... provides the input for developing units of a theory, its laws of
interaction, the system states, and the boundaries of the model. Without
adequate description, we would not have models that connect with the real
world that man perceives and about which he theorizes (1967:227).
In order to provide adequate description and move towards a theory of media politics
in the states, I answer a number of basic questions in this dissertation. Hopefully,
future scholars can use the results obtained here to help build a theory of media
politics in the state legislature. The questions I address are as follows.
First, I ask: how do state legislators in general feel about using the media to
further their policy goals? Do they view the media enterprise favorably or
unfavorably? To what extent do state legislators use the media? Do state legislators
perceive their media efforts as effective? How does these attitudes compare to the
attitudes of members of Congress? These questions address both behavioral and
attitudinal issues. In order to obtain a better understanding of how state legislators
and the media interact, we must find out how they feel about using the media tactics
as well as how often they use media tactics. Media tactics are ways in which
legislators attempt to affect the news. Indeed, much can be learned about the media
enterprise in the states by comparing what legislators think to what they do. As
Karen Kedrowski commented in her study of the media and Congress, "The
8

difference between media entrepreneurs and their colleagues is fundamentally
attitudinal first and behavioral second" (1996: 12). A full understanding of the media
enterprise in the state legislature requires an understanding of both behavioral and
attitudinal issues.
I also ask, who uses the media? In other words, what demographic and
political factors predict how often legislators uses media tactics to achieve their
goals? There is often the picture of a younger, more telegenic politician who actively
courts media coverage, while the older, more traditional "workhorses" labor behind
the scenes. While a number of recent studies have suggested that this is an outdated
distinction to make regarding members of Congress (Cook 1986; Langbein and
Sigelman 1989), I intend to see if this stereotype holds for state legislators.
Next, I ask, how frequently do legislators engage in various strategies of
media relations? It stands to reason that legislators will perceive certain media
activities as more worthy of expending time and energy than others. Some activities
reach mass audiences while others reach only select audiences. Some require a large
expense of resources while others do not. Do legislators make distinctions along
these lines? For example, I ask, how often do legislators issue press releases versus
how often do they appear on public access television? A related question asks, how
often do legislators engage in media-related activities as opposed to more traditional
means of legislating?
Next, using the stages model of the policy process (DeLeon 1999), I ask,
when in the policy process are legislators most likely to use media tactics? There is
9

considerable debate over when legislators engage in media strategies (Kedrowski
1996). Traditionally, it has been assumed that the media is used overwhelmingly in
the agenda-setting stage of the policy process. I seek to find if this assumption holds
in the state legislature, or if the media is used at other stages of the policy process.
Finally, our understanding of the media-state legislature relationship would be
incomplete without asking, whom do state legislators seek to reach with their media
strategies? Some scholars have suggested that legislators often use the media to reach
other legislators and members of the policy community (Kedrowski 1996), while
others suggest they aim only to reach constituents with their media efforts (Hess
1991). Obviously, this is a central and important question that must be answered
before any theory of the media' role in the stage legislature can be developed.
Throughout my discussion of each of these questions, I refer to the
conclusions of congressional scholars examining similar questions in order to move
toward a more general theory of the media and politics.

The Data
There are over 5,000 state legislators in the United States. Unfortunately, cost
prohibited a survey of the universe of state legislators. Instead, I chose to survey the
population of state legislators in three states: California, Georgia and Iowa.
Researchers who conduct comparative state research and are unable to examine the
universe of states must opt for either a most similar or most different systems design
(Collier 1993). A most similar systems (MSS) design examines states with similar
characteristics. The advantage of MSS is that the researcher is able to make stronger
10

conclusions about that particular type of state, providing high internal validity.
Consequently, MSS is disadvantaged when it comes to making generalizations about
states in general. Hence, it is low in external validity. A most different systems
(MDS) design provides the researcher with high external validity, but much lower

internal validity (Przeworski and Tune 1970; Przeworski 1987). In other words,
researchers using MOS are able to make generalizations about all states with more
confidence, but are less confident when making statements about one particular type
of state. As this dissertation is concerned with moving towards a theory of media
politics in the states, not in a few particular states, a most different systems approach
was chosen. I should also note that the majority of recent studies examining
legislative behavior in the states (i.e. Freeman and Richardson 1996; Richardson and
Freeman 1995; Thomas 1991) utilize an MDS approach. The characteristics of both
MDS and MSS designs can be found in Table 1. All tables and figures can be found
in Appendix A.
Consistent with MOS, the three states selected were chosen with an eye to
providing the broadest array of political and geographic characteristics. Those
characteristics are reviewed below.
California, Georgia and Iowa all differ as to region, population, legislative
professionalism, political culture, public opinion/policy liberalism, and the structure
of media markets. While region and population are fairly self-explanatory, the last
four criteria deserve brief explanation.

11

Legislative Professionalism
States differ as to legislative professionalism. Briefly, "state legislative
professionalism generally refers to the enhancement of the capacity of the legislature
to perform its role in the policy making process with an expertise, seriousness and
effort comparable to that of other actors in the process" (Mooney 1994:70-71).
Professionalism has been a hot topic in political science, as almost all states have
become more professional over the last 20 years (Pound 1992). Professionalism has
been linked to "the frequency of legislator-citizen contacts, decision-making process
of the legislature, propensity to alter the committee structure and legislative
efficiency" (King 2000:328).
Although there are a number of different measures of professionalism (Grum
1971; Morehouse 1983; Citizens Conference on State Legislatures 1971; Bowman
and Kearney 1988; King 2000), most agree that facilities, session length, size of
support staff and legislative salaries are among the most important indicators of the
concept. Despite the wealth of choices in indices, Mooney ( 1994) found that all
measures are similar and the choice of measure matters little. Given this conclusion, I
have chosen Peverill Squire's measure of professionalism (Squire 1993). The scale is
a combination of three factors (pay, session length and staff), which makes the scale
fairly simple to understand and easy to replicate. Furthermore, it uses the common
standard of the United States Congress. This means that the US Congress always
receives a score of 100 and each state legislature's professionalism is measured as a
proportion of this score. This too aids in interpretation (Mooney 1994). Finally,
12

Squire's score was updated in 2000 (King 2000), making it the most up-to-date
measure of professionalism.

In short, although any measure would produce similar

results, the Squire measure provides the most easily interpretable and recently
updated measure. Using this measure, (King 2000), I find that the states differ as to
professionalism. While California is the most professional legislature, Iowa falls just
under the mean score and Georgia ranks near the bottom in professionalism (See
Table 2 for specific scores).
Political Culture
The states selected also differ as to political culture (Elazar 1966). Political
culture is defined by Daniel Elazar as "the particular pattern of orientation to political
action in which each political system is embedded" (Elazar 1966:79). Political
culture has been linked to, among other things, a state's economic development,
attitudes towards business and general policy outcomes (Bowman and Kearney
2000). Although numerous critiques have been made (Lieske 1993), Daniel Elazar's
typology of political culture remains the standard measure. Elazar posits that three
political cultures exist in the United States. First, an individualistic political culture is
one in which government is viewed as secondary to the liberty and freedom of the
individual. Generally speaking, people in this culture oppose excessive government
interference. The second culture is moralistic. In this culture, citizens are expected to
work towards the "greater good." Government can be used as a means to reach this
goal. Finally, a traditionalistic political culture is marked by hierarchy and order.
Government should not displace the existing order. While each region of a state may
13

exhibit a slightly different culture, the states examined in this study can broadly be
defined as Individualistic/moralistic (California), traditionalistic (Georgia) and
moralistic/individualistic (Iowa). While other, more methodologically sophisticated
measures of cultures may provide slightly different interpretations of political culture
(see, for example Lieske 1993), the vastly different populations of California, Georgia
and Iowa suggest that regardless of the specific measure, states differ as to culture.

Public Opinion
State public opinion is quite simply, a measure of the aggregate political
ideology of citizens in any given state. These opinions are considered in relation to
the traditional scale of liberalism-conservatism. Although there are a number of
measures of public opinion in the states, the most frequently cited and sophisticated
measure was developed by Erikson, Wright and Mclver (Hereafter EWM) (1989;
1987; 1993). EWM refer to their measure as policy liberalism. A high score on their
scale is associated with a very liberal citizenry, while a low score indicates a state
with a very conservative citizenry. According to EWM's measure, Arkansas is the
most conservative state in the country, garnering a score of -1.54, while New York
ranks as the most liberal state with a score of 2.12. EWM also find that public
opinion of the electorate, rather than the partisan control of the legislature, or the
economic conditions of the state is the best predictor of policy outcomes in the states.
While related, the notion of state public opinion is distinct from culture. EWM define
culture as "only that portion of state public opinion that cannot be accounted for by
the group characteristics of the state electorate" (1987:798). Thus, culture and
14

opinion are complimentary but theoretically distinct concepts. California, Georgia
and Iowa all reside on different ends of EWM's scale. While California receives a
policy liberalism score of 1.49, Georgia receives a score of .44 and Iowa receives a
score of-1.04 (Erikson, Wright and Mclver 1993). The characteristics of the selected
states can be found in Table 2.
Media Stn,cture

Finally, each state has vastly a different media structure. California has a
number of large media markets (e.g. San Francisco, Sacramento, Los Angeles and
San Diego). Georgia is dominated by one media market (Atlanta), has a smaller
market (Savannah) and is also influenced by a nearby state's market-Jacksonville,
Florida. While Iowa has no media markets with over 1,000,000 households,
(Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook 1999), it is dominated by the presence of the Des
Moines market. While Davenport, Cedar Rapids and a host of other small cities have
television stations and newspapers; it is nonetheless Des Moines media (in particular,
the Des Moines Register) that dominate the state.
In sum, I chose three states that varied on as many dimensions as possible.
California, Georgia and Iowa display markedly different characteristics on scales of
professionalism, political culture and policy liberalism/public opinion. They also
reside in different regions of the country (West, Midwest and East, respectively),
have different sized populations (CA=33,871,648; IA=2,926,324; GA=S,186,453)
and have different media structures. The differences ensure that the conclusions
gleaned from this study will be generalizeable to as many different states as possible.
15

Once I determined the states, it was time to create the survey instrument.
Although the instrument is included in Appendix B, a few notes about its construction
are in order. Indeed, far too many studies in state politics utilize survey data, but do
not adequately explain the methodology used (Maestas, Neeley and Richardson
2001).
The survey was created to correspond with Dillman's Total Quality Method
(1978). The survey totaled seven pages, equal to the number of pages in recent
surveys (e.g. Hedge, Button and Spear 1996) and fewer than the ten to twelve page
maximum suggested by Dillman (1978). Open-ended questions were kept to a
minimum. The questionnaire was designed so that respondents could complete the
instrument in less than ten minutes. In keeping with the suggestion of Maestas,
Neeley and Richardson that "researchers should standardize question wording and
response scales for commonly studied concepts," (2001: 14) I use many of the same
questions used by Kedrowski (1996) in her study of media entrepreneurship in the
U.S. Congress. Utilizing many of the same questions not only alleviates many
concerns of question validity, but enables me to make more direct and conclusive
comparisons between the activities of members of Congress and state legislators.
I enclosed a brief cover letter and a self-addressed stamped envelope with the
survey instrument. In order to increase credibility with respondents, the cover letter
was printed on University of Tennessee, Department of Political Science letterhead.
Keeping with Dillman's suggestions (1978), the cover letter was brief. It reviewed
the purpose of the survey, stressed the importance of each individual response and
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assured respondent confidentiality. For a copy of the cover letter, please see
Appendix 1.
After a first wave of surveys was sent and responses were received, a second
wave was sent to nonrespondents. A favorable response rate of 38.2% was achieved
for the entire survey. The response rate never fell below 30% for any of the three
states surveyed (California= 31 %, Georgia=31 %, Iowa= 50% ). This surpasses the
response rate of recent published works sampling members of Congress (Kedrowski
1996; Kedrowski 2000) as well as state legislators and their staff (Button and Hedge
1996; Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman 2001).
Due to time constraints, staff members often fill out survey instruments rather
than legislators themselves (Hess 1984; Kedrowski 1996). Consistent with
Kedrowski ( 1996), rather than ignore this potential bias, respondents were asked to
indicate whether they were a legislator or a staff member. Staff members who did
complete the instrument were instructed to respond in relation to the opinions and
strategies of their representative, rather than their own personal opinions. Legislators
completed 77% of the surveys, while staffers completed 23%. The average staff
member who filled out the instrument had worked for his/her current employer for 2
½ years. The results from legislators and staffers differed in no substantive way.

Evidence suggests the legislators who returned surveys bear striking
resemblance to the population of all legislators in the sampled states. Table 3 shows
that the two groups differ little as to party, sex or chamber. The only place where the
sample differs to any substantial degree is in relation to party. The sample of
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legislators in California and Iowa is slightly more Republican than the population in
the same states. Although I do not have responses from the universe of legislators,
considering the response rate, techniques used to construct the survey and evidence
about the population who responded, I feel confident that the data were collected
appropriately and that the results are valid and reliable.
What Follows

This dissertation has implications for both legislative representation and the policy
process in the states. Chapter 2 lays out a framework for how understanding how the
media affect the process of representation in the states. Since political
communication is still a relatively new subfield in political science, it is quite rich in
description, but often lacking in theory (Bennett 1990; Cook 1998). As such, I posit
no specific theory of how the media affect the process of representation. Instead, I
develop a broad framework from which to understand the results presented in
subsequent chapters.
After developing an understanding of the media's role in legislative
representation, I then focus on how state legislators use the media to achieve their
legislative goals of reelection, good public policy and power inside the legislature.
Since no extant work exists on how state legislators use the media to achieve these
goals, I rely instead on the work by Timothy Cook (1989; 1998), Stephen Hess (1984;
1986), Burdett Loomis (1988), and Karen Kedrowski (1996) about how members of
Congress use the media to achieve legislative goals.
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Finally, Chapter 2 reviews what we know about how media content influences
the opinions, knowledge, priorities and choices of individual citizens. After all, if the
media do not affect what people believe about politics, then why would legislators
use media to achieve legislative goals?
In short, Chapter 2 provides context for this dissertation and suggests where
the media fit into broader questions of legislative behavior. While understanding how
legislators use the media may help us understand a portion of legislative behavior, it
is only a portion. Thus, this dissertation addresses one piece, albeit an important
piece of the puzzle of legislative behavior. Taken as a whole, Chapter 2 serves two
roles. First, it provides a brief review of the salient literature on legislative behavior
and political communication. Second, and more importantly, it presents a framework
to understand how the media fit into broader issues of legislative behavior. While
Chapter 2 does not posit a specific theory of the role of the media in the state
legislature, it does work towards this ultimate goal.
Chapter 3 begins the data analysis. This chapter answers the most basic
questions in the study. First, it addresses to what extent state legislators use the
media. Despite frequent suggestions that media are important in state legislatures
(Rosenthal 1998), no one has established if this is in fact true. After establishing that
many state legislators do, in fact use media tactics, I ask which legislators use such
tactics. In other words, what factors predict whether a legislator will utilize media
strategies in the completion of her job? Next I ask, what audiences do they seek to
reach with these tactics? Although few doubt that politicians utilize the media to
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reach constituents, there is considerable debate as to whether politicians utilize the
media to reach other audiences (For both sides of the debate, see Hess 1986 and
Kedrowski 1996). This chapter weighs in on this debate. Next, I discuss the
frequency with which state legislators utilize media tactics as opposed to more
traditional means of legislating. Fina11y, this chapter addresses when in the policy
process legislators use media tactics. As a whole, this chapter discusses the who,
what, when, where and why of the relationship between state legislators and the
media.
Chapter 4 looks at the other side of the press-state legislative connection by
addressing media consumption by state legislators. In particular, I seek to find out
how often legislators utilize the media as a source for information. More specifically,
I discuss what factors determine which legislators use which medium. Taken in
conjunction with Chapter 3, this should provide the reader with both sides of the
press-government relationship.
While the first four chapters focus mainly on traditional media, Chapter 5
looks at the role of the "new media" in the state legislature. In particular, it looks at
how legislators use email and the Internet to communicate with a variety of
audiences.
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. The results gleaned from the previous
chapters are reviewed and placed into a larger framework. Keeping in mind that this
is a dissertation mostly about legislative behavior, Chapter 6 discusses how this study
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has improved our knowledge of legislative behavior in the states. Finally, I conclude
with some suggestions for future research directions in the area.

Summary
Despite evidence of the growing importance of state politics (Van Hom 1996) and the
continued importance of the media in politics (Cook 1998; Sparrow 1999), virtually
no one has tried to understand how the media and state politics work in conjunction.
In this dissertation, I try to do just that. Whatever the conclusions, the evidence
provided here will provide a marked improvement in our understanding of how state
legislators behave.
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CHAPTER II
SETTING THE STAGE

Three separate streams of literature inform this study. First, as I mentioned in
Chapter I, the primary assumption of this work is that legislators use media to
achieve three legislative goals: reelection, good public policy and power inside the
legislature. As a result, I review the literature about these three goals, focusing on
what we know about how media tactics help legislators realize these goals. In order
for these tactics to work, we must next establish the ways in which media affects the
priorities, beliefs and choices of individual citizens. Fortunately, there is a
tremendous amount of literature that examines these very questions. I review this
literature next. Finally, any study about legislatures must speak to issues of
representation. As a result, the third section of this chapter briefly reviews what we
know about legislative representation, focusing on how media relations impact
representation in the states.

Achieving Legislative Goals
First, we return to Richard Fenno's triad of legislative goals. Fenno claims that
legislators have three goals: reelection, pow.er inside the legislature and good public
policy (1978). In order to reach these goals, they must communicate with a variety of
audiences. In order to gain reelection, legislators must communicate with
constituents. In order to gain power inside the legislature, they communicate with
policy elites. Finally, in order to achieve good public policy, they must communicate
with both constituents and political elites. Although there are a number of means of
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communication, one primary way is through the media. If a legislator gains media
coverage, she may reach a number of audiences at one time. Gaining media coverage
can be a low-cost, high-yield means of communication. In this chapter, I discuss each
of these roles in more detail, discussing what we know about how media is used to
accomplish these goals.

Reelection
The majority of the literature in political communication has focused on how
media consumption affects individual vote choice. This literature spans from the
early debate over maximum verses minimum effects to current disagreements over
the impact of negative advertising. While this literature will be reviewed in tum,
suffice it to say, scholars now agree that an aggressive media campaign can increase a
legislator's chance of reelection. Indeed, the ability to easily gain media coverage is
one of the main advantages afforded incumbent legislators (Herrnson 1998). While
the legislator does not have complete control over the content of media coverage,
"media endorsements and campaign coverage can have a significant impact on
elections" (Herrnson 1998: 191). While this dissertation does not focus on explicitly
campaign-related activities, it does deal with legislators' efforts to reach constituents.
Certainly reelection concerns are always present in any communication with
constituents.

Achieving Good Policy
In one of the seminal works on the public policy process, Cobb and Elder
(1983) posited that there are two parallel policy agendas: the systemic agenda and the
formal agenda. The systemic agenda consists of the ideas under consideration by the
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public. The formal agenda consists of those issues under consideration by political
elites. Legislators attempting to make policy can either influence the formal agenda
directly, or may work through the systemic agenda with the hopes that items on the
systemic agenda will eventually reach the formal agenda.
Regardless of which agenda they choose to influence, legislators have a
number of ways of achieving policy success. They may talk directly to other
legislators to convince them to support their policy (Arnold, Deen and Patterson
2001). They may actively participate in committee to gain passage of an important
bill (Hall 1996). They may directly lobby the executive branch to help gain support
(Fisher 1998). They may contact a variety of organized interests to rally support
(Ainsworth 1997). Finally, they may gain media coverage. This media coverage
may be aimed at the public, thus influencing the systemic agenda, or may be aimed at
political elites, thus influencing the formal agenda. Although there is no extant
literature addressing how state legislators may use the media in the policy process,
some literature does exist on how members of Congress use the media to further their
policy agendas. While these findings certainly do not translate directly to the state
legislature, they do provide us with a nice point of departure.
Prior to the 1980s, it was assumed that media were important players in
legislative politics, although there was little hard evidence. Donald Matthews (1960)
suggested that senators often cultivate relationships with journalists to receive good
coverage. Matthews assumed that this coverage was used for a number of purposes,
including but not limited to, communicating with other legislators. According to
Matthews, if a legislator garners positive media coverage, the chances of that
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legislator passing legislation increase. Matthews' findings thus suggest that media
relations constitute another nontraditional means of achieving policy success.
Surprisingly, while most studies of Congress throughout the 1970s and early 1980s
gave passing mention the role of the media in the policy process, these studies shed
little light on exactly how the media were used in the policy process. In short, by
1985, conventional wisdom suggested that media were used in the policy process
(e.g. Ranney 1983; Robinson 1981), but we didn't know how or why.
In a radically different interpretation of the media's role on the legislative
process, Stephen Hess (1986) concluded that the power of the press in the lawmaking
process is often overstated. He admits, however, that "some legislators acting out of
optimism or ignorance or arrogance, may choose to use the media even though it is a
highly inefficient legislative strategy," (1986: 103). He answers, however, that these
members are the exception rather than the rule. According to Hess,
Trying to use the media to get legislation through Congress is a Rube
Goldberg design based on (A) legislator influencing (B) reporter to get
information into (C) news outlet so as to convince (D) voters who will then
put pressure on (E) other legislators. Given all of the problems inherent in
successfully maneuvering through the maze, no wonder that legislative
strategies are usually variations of (A) legislator asking (B) other legislators
for their support" (Hess 1986: 103).
In short, while Hess admits that legislators may use the media to communicate with
constituents to gain reelection, he denies that legislators use the media to achieve
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policy success. According to Hess, the media cannot help effect what occurs in the
policy arena, they can only reflect it.
Although Hess' work continues to stand as a caution to scholars who get
overly enthusiastic about the value of the media as a tool in the policy process, his
conclusions have been questioned by scholars in recent years. For instance, Tim
Cook argues:
Congress has shifted in the last fifty years from an institution where its
members dealt almost exclusively with the press back home in their
constituencies for electoral purposes (with a few high-profile exceptions of
investigations or mavericks) to one where both backbenchers and leaders
routinely seek national publicity to influence national policy (1998b: 150).
Certainly, using the media is not the only way legislators achieve legislative
success. But proper attention to the media may help a bill that otherwise would have
been assured failure. Alternatively, legislators may use media to help kill legislation
that they oppose. As New York Representative Tom Downey commented,
Seeking publicity is one way-an important way-of conveying your
message. Ultimately that results in good legislation. There are a lot of people
who do good work around here, but that doesn't necessarily mean that you'll
get recognized for it. Not getting publicity limits your effectiveness ... .I can't
think of someone around here who's effective just by being on the inside
(Loomis 1988:80).
Simply stated, making laws and making news are often complimentary (Cook 1989).
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In this strongest defense of the notion that legislators use media to legislate,
Karen Kedrowki (1996) introduces the concept of the media entrepreneur in
Congress. Kedrowski posits that members often use the media to influence public
policy. According to Kedrowski, this includes efforts to reach the formal agenda .
..These efforts are distinct from members' efforts to use the media to communicate
with constituents or to campaign for reelection" (Kedrowski 1996: 191 ). Members
who frequently use the media in the policy process are known as media

entrepreneurs. The media entrepreneur first attempts to gain the media's attention.
Garnering media attention in turn gains the interest of other audiences and often leads
to more media attention. The advantages of the former are quite obvious. If a
legislator can reach organized interests, policy elites, and other legislators with her
message, this can provide an unconventional and often successful way to increase the
likelihood of getting her way on the issue. Scholars have frequently suggested that
this results in a dichotomy between show-horse legislators who do little work and
spend their time trying to gain media attention, and work-horses who shirk media
attention and instead work hard behind the scenes to pass good policy (Payne 1980).
Kedrowski's findings refute this oft-cited conclusion. Once again, it appears that
gaining media coverage and passing good policy often go together. This process of
media entrepreneurship is summarized in Figure 1.
Media entrepreneurs are most likely to be non-southern, young, liberal
Democrats. Kedrowski found no relationship to seniority, however. "In other words,
at all levels of tenure (over and above age, party, and ideology), members of
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Congress seem to agree that the news media can work beneficially to accomplish
policy goals" (Cook 1998: 251).
In sum, Kedrowski' s work suggests that members use the media to
communicate with a variety of audiences for a variety of purposes. Work examining
media and Congress should no longer view media strategies as focused solely on
reaching constituents and securing reelection. Media strategies can be used to reach a
number of policy elites and are frequently used in the policy process. Reelection is
not the only goal of legislators, nor is it the only goal of media strategies. As one
member of Congress stated,
You get publicity around here for three reasons: First, to get re-elected.
Second, on behalf of a cause; there are 435 people there, [and] it's tough to
get them interested ... [if you get the media] other members pay attention,
especially if you're down on the lower half of the order. Third, there's
political advancement (Loomis 1988: 101).

Power Inside the Legislature
Media coverage may also increase a legislator's power inside the legislature.
By gaining coverage and increasing legislator's visibility, a legislator may create the
notion that she is a "player" in Washington, thus increasing her power inside the
institution. This increased visibility may also help the politician who has higher
career ambitions. If a legislator becomes more powerful in relation to the rest of the
body, she may be more successful in running for higher office. Likewise, she may
have an easier time gaining positions of power within the legislature (such as speaker,
majority leader, etc.).
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Why Are Media Strategies Increasingly Common?

It is clear from this literature that members of Congress increasingly use
media tactics in their jobs. Surely legislators have always sought to achieve
reelection, good policy and power within the legislature. Why, then are media tactics
increasingly used to achieve these goals? First, seniority is less important in
Congress than it once was (Davidson and Oleszek 1998; Sinclair 1997). Junior
members now frequently draft legislation. This makes it much easier for them to gain
coverage. The universe of members who can gain coverage is thus much larger than
it once was. Second, subcommittees are now more important in Congress. This gives
more members credibility on issues by virtue of being a subcommittee chair
(Kedrowski 1992). Third, even outside of committees and subcommittees, members
often become specialists on one particular issue. If a member is known as a
specialist, it gives her credibility on that issue and thus makes it easier to gain
coverage on that issue (Kedrowski 1992). Fourth, there has been a tremendous
growth in Congressional staff since the 1970' s (Davidson and Oleszek 1997). A
number of these staff members are now assigned to press relations (Cook 1988). This
has increased the number of people trying to gain media coverage in every
congressional office. Finally, the number of interested parties has increased
dramatically in Washington. The number of organized interests has increased
exponentially in the past few decades (Nownes 2001). Likewise, the size of the
federal bureaucracy and White House staff is massive. As a result, it is well nigh
impossible for a legislator to talk to each actor in the process. Gaining media
coverage is a way to reach a number of actors in the process with a single effort.
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Nature of Media Coverage: A Caution
Throughout this dissertation, I discuss legislators' efforts to gain media
coverage. Before continuing, I should note that legislators do not always receive
media coverage just because they want it. Nor does the coverage they receive always
look how they want it to. Indeed, the legislator does not have complete control over
the production of news. According to Tim Cook, the politician/media relationship
can best be understood as a "negotiation of newsworthiness" in which the two sides
bargain with each other to achieve their desired outcomes (Cook 1989). Each side
has a desired outcome that may be at odds with the desired outcome of the other
party. Neither the press nor the member (Cook 1998b) dominates this "coproduction"
of news. Each side helps shape the final output of news. Although members' press
strategies can be quite useful in setting the tone, context and alternatives of both
political elites and the public (Cook 1999), they are not universally successful.
Likewise, this section has illuminated the nature of the impact of media on the
policy process. We have learned that: (1) There are many ways to achieve policy
success; (2) A decentralized Congress that is beginning to shed its tradition of stiff
hierarchy has led to an increasing number of legislators who use media coverage as
one means of achieving policy success; (3) Legislators use media most often to set the
agenda in Congress; (4) The oft-cited distinction between work-horses and showhorses is no longer true (if it ever was); (5) Neither the legislator nor the journalist
unilaterally determines what will be covered on the news. Instead, they both engage
in a negotiation of newsworthiness that determines what the content of congressional
media coverage will look like.
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Transition to the States
While the above literature gives us a good picture of how members of
Congress use media to impact the policy process, it tells us little about how state
legislators use media to impact the policy process. Unfortunately, no extant literature
discusses how state legislators use media in, or out of the policy process. Certainly,
while members of Congress and state legislators work in similar environments, they
are not identical. While many state legislators maintain other jobs (Rosenthal 1998),
most members of Congress are full time politicians. Members of Congress have large
staffs at their disposal, while state legislators may be forced to share staff with
another legislator. Further, state legislators do not fit most of the traditional standards
of newsworthiness. As discussed in Chapter l, news on the state legislature is
infrequent and generally poor. One purpose of this study is to see how these
differences manifest themselves in the media strategies of state legislators and
members of Congress. Indeed, discovering the differences between these two
populations can move us towards a much better understanding of the role of media in
American legislative behavior.
The Media Effects Studies
The previous section established that legislators often use media to help achieve their
goals of reelection, good policy, and power inside the legislature (Fenno 1978).
Inherent within this is the assumption that individuals can and do learn from the
media. After all, if media content has no impact on their attitudes, opinions and
information, then legislators' media strategies would be wasted. This section gives a
brief overview of how citizens learn from the media and answers two central
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questions: (1) Does media content impact people's attitudes, opinions, choices and
information? (2) If so, how?
When scholars first began to study the importance of the media for affecting
individual opinion and choice, they were guided by the theory of the "hypodermic
effect." This view suggested that the media had a tremendous impact on people's
attitudes and opinions. This impact was suggested to be equivalent to a hypodermic
needle injecting the audience with media content and message (Klapper 1960). It did
not take long for political scientists to attempt to apply this theory to the voting booth.
The logic was that if media impact were "hypodermic," then media coverage of
elections would directly influence people's vote choice. If the media treated one
candidate positively, for example, the people would likewise follow in their positive
evaluation of that candidate.
A number of scholars attempted to corroborate this hypothesis. What they
found, however, was that the media did not have a "hypodermic effect" on people's
opinions. In fact, they concluded that the media's impact on people's opinions was
minimal (Katz and Lazarfeld 1955; Klapper 1960). Media coverage seemed to have
little impact on people's vote choice or general attitude towards specific candidates.
According to early media scholars, the media's only impact on citizen opinion was to
reinforce previously held opinions and preferences. (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse
1962; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee
1954).
The remarkable consistency of vote preferences and citizen opinion was
attributed to two factors. First, voters have "standing commitments" which make
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them less apt to be swayed by campaign messages. Second, those most likely to pay
attention to election coverage are those with the strongest partisan loyalties. These
individuals tend to have fairly consistent and closely held beliefs (Ansolabehere,
Iyengar and Simon 1997) and consume media that does not challenge their previously
held belief. In other words, a conservative citizen will tend to consume media with a
conservative tilt. Likewise, liberals consume media that tends to have a liberal
perspective. For instance, the majority of listeners to the notoriously conservative
Rush Limbaugh program are extremely conservative (Barker 1998). This "selective
exposure" has later become known as cognitive dissonance theory (Zillman and
Bryan 1985).
While the conclusions of Berelson et al. (1954) were successful in shattering
the hypodermic effect, their work has come under fire for methodological reasons.
For example, Hovland (1959) suggested that Berelson et al's use of national polls in
order to measure short-term change is a bit suspect. "National polls are not wellequipped to detect short-term swings in political opinions in response to specific
stimuli" (Ansolabehere, Iyengar and Simon 1997: 151).
While the minimal effects conclusion was corroborated during the late 1970s
and early 1980s (Patterson and McClure 1975; Patterson 1980; Zajone 1980;
McGwire 1985), scholars in recent years have questioned whether the effects of the
media on vote choice might be more substantial (Finkel 1993). Some critics believe
that as a result of increased independent and uncommitted voters (Allsop and
Weisberg 1988; Mendelsohn and O'Keefe 1976), as well as decreased party
affiliation (McCubbins 1992; Patterson 1993), the effects of the media on vote choice
33

might have increased in the 1990s. Furthermore, minimal effects conclusions were
based almost exclusively on cross-sectional surveys. This method cannot show
individual opinion or preference change, but can merely show one snapshot of time
(Finkel 1993). Obviously, the exclusive use of cross-sectional analysis presents
serious methodological barriers to any conclusion regarding attitude and opinion
change over time (Bartels 1993; Arterton 1978; Sigelman and Rosenblatt 1996).
Furthermore, a number of scholars have found that in congressional campaigns
(Herrnson 1997; Goldenberg and Traugott 1983), primary election campaigns
(Bartels 1988; Orren and Polsby 1987), and other elections where candidates are not
well known, the media's impact on vote preference may be considerably more
substantial. In short, due to methodological considerations and the changing
American political environment, scholars began to question the wisdom of the
minimal effects conclusion in the 1990s.
In response to questions about the applicability of previous work, Steven
Finkel (1993) revisited the question and found data both supporting and refuting the
minimal effects conclusion. Although Finkel finds little evidence that the media
directly alter voter loyalties between April and October of an election year, he
concludes that the potential for such preference shift certainly exists. Panel studies
suggest "if there were larger changes in the overall distributions of presidential
approval or in the perceptions of the two candidates' competence and integrity, the
effects of the campaign on the vote would have been more considerable" (Finkel
1993: 18). Furthermore, while the media may not cause a large number of individuals
to shift their preference, it may foster higher or lower turnout that in tum helps one
34

candidate at the expense of the other. Finally, Finkel suggests that although we may
refer to small effects as "minimal," it is a bit misleading. Presidential elections are
often decided on margins of less than three percent. Thus, even a minimal media
effect can be significant. Certainly, the 2000 Presidential election speaks to the
wisdom of this point.
John Zaller (1996) went beyond the traditional criticisms of the minimal
effects conclusion and suggested that the media may in fact have the "massive
impact" originally suggested. He concluded that due to problems in measurement
and research design, the early studies of media impact were unable to discover media
effects. While Zaller discusses the inadequacies of the cross-sectional approach, his
critique centers mainly upon the lack of adequate variance in traditional measures of
the content of communication to which individuals are exposed. He argues that the
flow of political communication in the United States is fairly stable over time.
Therefore, studies of the persuasive effects of the media that rely on typical measures
of the independent variable are unable to account for the type of variation necessary
to produce significant effects (see also Hofstetter 1976). He concludes that early
studies were therefore unable to produce significant results, regardless of the actual
impact of the media on people's opinions and attitudes (Zaller 1996). In the end,
Zaller concludes that "very large campaign effects-effects of mass
communication-do occur" (Zaller 1996: 36). He continues:
This contribution is, I hope, sufficient to convince my professional peers that,
in spite of 50 years of mostly null or modest results from research on the
effects of mass communication, it is still possible that very large media
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persuasion effects are lurking all around us, waiting to be brought more fully
to light by more appropriate measures, models, and theoretical perspectives.
Scholars have long viewed media effects as an interaction between citizens
and the media, ignoring the role of politicians themselves. More recently, Dalton,
Beck and Huckfeldt (1998), and Just et. al (1996) suggested that campaigns actually
constitute a three part interaction between news media, the public and the politician.
Dalton, Beck and Huckfeldt look at the flow of information in the 1992 presidential
election in three parts-media coverage, perception of media coverage by the public,
and candidate preferences of individuals. Because of differences in circulation and
traditions of party-based reporting, the authors look at newspapers, as they provide
more of an opportunity for bias than television or radio news. In the end, Dalton et al.
( 1998) conclude that media coverage of elections doesn't consistently support one
side or the other. Instead, coverage of elections includes a number of different voices
and dimensions-- at times positive towards one candidate, at other times positive
towards the other. Dalton et. al ( 1998) also find that the tone and content of election
coverage varies little from one paper to the next. Despite generally unbiased
coverage, partisans are likely to perceive newspaper coverage as biased against their
preferred candidate. The authors also analyze editorials in newspapers and conclude
that "political cues provided by editorials have a significant positive effect on
candidate image even when controlling for partisanship" (122). Furthermore,
editorial cues are stronger for papers with more consistent partisan cues than for
newspapers whose party cues were highly variable. Dalton et al's conclusions follow
closely with the conclusions of Just et al, who suggest that an individuals' public
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information environment is an important factor in the considerations that one makes
using this information.
Best and Hubbard (1999) revisit the question of minimal effects from a
slightly different perspective. They echo Zaller's concerns about methodological
inadequacies. In particular, they suggest that techniques used in the past are unable to
measure proper variance when preferences are anchored by nine months of prior
information. While not looking specifically at news broadcasts (Best and Hubbard
look at the effect of televised debates on political behavior), Best and Hubbard
conclude, "debates possess the capacity to influence viewers' campaign engagement,
issue appraisals and candidate evaluations" ( 1999:450). In other words, debates
televised and broadcast through the media have the potential to alter the course of an
election, calling into question once more the logic of the minimal effects model.
In short, there has been a tremendous amount of debate about whether the
media have an effect on the opinions, priorities, information and choices of citizens.
Through an examination of the relevant literature and its evolution, we can conclude:
(1) Cries of minimal effects were incorrect. 50 years of scholarship has effectively
debunked the minimal effects hypothesis. (2) The hypodermic effect has likewise,
been debunked. What citizens view on television isn't magically injected into their
opinions, priorities and choices. The process of cognition is much more nuanced than
that. (3) The media do have an effect on individual opinions and choices, particularly
in elections where citizen information about candidates is less. (4) Even a small
media impact can be extremely important at election time. The razor thin victory in
the 2000 Presidential election attests to the importance of small changes in opinion.
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These findings are vital for our study of media and the state legislature. They
show conclusively that if legislators use media to influence the opinions, attitudes,
priorities and choices of citizens, it can work. Some of their message will reach the
viewer. Although it is not guaranteed, this message may sway a voter or change a
constituent's mind about an important issue. Likewise, if a legislator uses media
content as a gauge of public opinion, she can learn from the media they consume.
While the previous section has given a broad overview of media effects, it
ignores the key alternatives to the maximum or minimum effects debate-the theories
of agenda setting, priming and framing. Together with the previous discussion,
grounding in these theories will demonstrate conclusively that media are important in
effecting the opinions, priorities and choices of individuals.

Agenda Setting
The theory of agenda setting in its purest form posits that the media "may not
be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly
successful in telling its readers what to think about" (Cohen 1963: 13). "Agendasetting is about the transmission of salience, not the determination of opinions pro and
con about a particular issue" (Mc Combs 1997: 433 ). If the media can set the agenda
of what people deem as the most important issues in politics and government, this
knowledge impacts candidate evaluation and as a result, candidate choice and
preference. Likewise, if politicians can effect media coverage and this in tum affects
the priorities of citizens, politicians have a direct and productive reason to use the
media to communicate.
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Walter Lippman first proposed a notion similar to agenda-setting more than
50 years ago. He suggested that the media provides people with "pictures in the
head" (Lippman 1922). The issue lay dormant for a number of years while the
minimal effects model dominated studies of political communication. In 1972,
Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw published what would become the seminal
article in the agenda-setting literature. McCombs and Shaw ( 1972) conducted a
cross-sectional study in which they compared the frequency of media mentions of a
particular issue to the priorities of 100 undecided voters in the Chapel Hill, NC area.
Mccombs and Shaw (1972) discovered an extremely high correlation between the
salience of the media's agenda and the public's agenda. They concluded from this
study that the media "set the agenda" for the public.
While McCombs and Shaw's study made an immediate splash in the
academic community and caused many to question the minimal effects conclusion
that dominated studies of the media and elections, it was not without methodological
problems. First, Mccombs and Shaw used a limited sample and looked only at a
cross-section of voters and media stories, providing only a limited snapshot of time,
not the dynamic process they so boldly claimed (Rogers, Hart and Deering 1997).
Agenda-setting research soon expanded beyond the rather limited scope of Mccombs
and Shaw's original study as scholars reconsidered agenda setting using broader and
more advanced methodological tests. For instance, Funkhouser (1973) examined the
media agenda for an entire year and compared it to the public's agenda over the same
time-period. Not to be outdone, Shaw and McCombs later revisited the agendasetting hypothesis. In a 1977 study, they used a larger and more representative
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sample, expanded their definition of media to include both television and newspapers,
and discarded the cross-sectional design for a more methodologically sophisticated
panel design. These dramatic changes in technique, however, did not alter the
conclusion. The agenda-setting hypothesis was once again supported. In the years
that followed, a number of scholars (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Erbring, Goldenberg and
Miller 1980; Tipton, Hanry and Baseheart (1975); Weaver, Graber, McCombs and
Eyal 1981; Winter and Eyal 1981) continued to examine agenda setting using a
variety of populations while employing a longitudinal design.
The next major methodological and theoretical step was made by Shanto
Iyengar and Don Kinder (1987) who revisited the notion of agenda setting (see also
Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982). While Maxwell McCombs had earlier remarked
that "agenda setting may be an apt metaphor, but it is no theory" (1981: 332), Iyengar
and Kinder (1987) were able to develop the first true theory of agenda-setting.
Iyengar and Kinder performed 14 laboratory experiments over a number of years to
see if being exposed to different glimpses of the political world effect individuals'
perception of that world. While longitudinal designs were a considerable advance
over the cross-sectional work done by the original generation of agenda setting
scholars, Iyengar and Kinder's experiment was able to control variables in such a way
to suggest actual causation, not merely correlation.
Iyengar and Kinder conclude, "Television news powerfully influences which
problems viewers regard as the nation's most serious" (1987: 35). The group who
had viewed news broadcasts highlighting the environment was much more likely than
the control group to site the environment as one of the most important issues facing
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America today. Likewise, those who viewed newscasts with a focus on defense were
more likely to suggest that the national defense and military strength was one of the
most important issues facing America today. As McCombs had suggested years
before, Iyengar and Kinder conclusively demonstrated that television news doesn't
tell people what to think, it tells people what to think about. In the words of Iyengar
and Kinder, "those problems that receive prominent attention on the national news
become the problems the viewing public regards as the nation's most important"
(1987: 16).
While Iyengar and Kinder made a significant contribution by corroborating
the agenda-setting hypothesis, they also took their study farther and examined the
nature and characteristics of agenda setting. For example, they demonstrated that
stories that appear earlier in the news broadcast are more likely to affect people's
beliefs and priorities. Viewers tend to "tune out" news stories at the end of the
broadcast, understanding the journalistic norm that the most important stories are
carried early in the broadcast. Accordingly, they are most directly affected by stories
early in the broadcast.
Iyengar and Kinder also discovered that the people most susceptible to agenda
setting are those with little political knowledge. Those with little political knowledge
are easily swayed and duped into accepting the priorities presented by mass media.
Political knowledge can combat the agenda setting effect. Those with high levels of
political knowledge are able to provide a better defense system to protect against the
transference of journalistic values and priorities to their own.
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Scholars have also confirmed the agenda-setting hypothesis cross-nationally.
For example, Hans-Bernd Brosius and Hans Mathias Kepplinger (1990) examined
agenda setting in Germany for the year 1986. They found that the five most covered
issues in the news were also the five most important issues to the public as measured
through weekly public opinion polls, thus supporting the agenda setting hypothesis.
Takeshita and Mikami (1995) later confirmed the agenda-setting hypothesis in Japan
while McCombs and Lopez-Escobar demonstrated evidence of the agenda setting in
parliamentary elections in Mexico (paraphrased from McCombs and Estrada 1996).
Semetko and Canel extended the study of agenda setting into elections in Spain's
1996 elections and once again the hypothesis was corroborated (1997).
The theory of agenda setting stands in stark-contrast to both the minimal
effects model and the hypodermic view of media effects. Agenda setting research
suggests that the media can define the voter's agenda, rather than determine voters'
opinions. The agenda setting effect has been demonstrated by correlating media
attention and public opinion. It has been shown using laboratory experiments. It has
been shown to work cross-nationally. In short, the agenda-setting effect is real.
An understanding of agenda setting is directly applicable to our understanding
of the relationship between state legislators and the media. Agenda setting research
suggests that if a legislator is able to gain media coverage, she will be most successful
trying to influence her constituents' priorities rather than their mind. For instance, a
legislator would be more successful using media in the agenda-setting and issue
definition stages of any campaign. Resources spent trying to change citizens' minds
could be better spent influencing their priorities.

42

Priming

Iyengar and Kinder's discussion of agenda setting also broke new ground in
their exploration of the priming hypothesis. Through a series of experimental tests,
Iyengar, Kinder and their scholarly progeny discovered that not only does the media
affect the agenda of individual citizens, but that this may in tum affect citizens'
evaluation of various candidates (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar et al. 1984;
Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982). While similar, priming and agenda setting are
distinct concepts with different implications. Simply stated, the priming hypothesis
suggests that
When evaluating complex political objects, citizens do not take into account
all that they know ... what they do consider is what comes to mind, those bits
and pieces of political memory that are accessible ... by priming certain aspects
of national life while ignoring others, television news sets the terms by which
political judgments are rendered and political choices made (Iyengar and
Kinder 1987:63).
The foundation of priming suggests that Americans are overloaded with
information (Graber 1988). Citizens cannot possibly take into account every piece of
information in their evaluations of politicians and political candidates. Individuals
are therefore forced to make decisions using only limited information. Most people
take in only the information they consider "adequate" and make their decision from
this information. This process is known as "satisficing" (Simon 1957; Simon and
Stedry 1968). One way to satisfice is to use one or a number of cognitive shortcuts or
heuristics. One of the most frequently used heuristics, the accessibility heuristic,
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suggests that people rely upon information that is most accessible in their memory,
that is, information that comes to mind quickly and easily (Tversky and Kahneman
1981; Taylor 1982; Pious 1993). Priming relies on this notion of availability and
suggests that by covering certain stories at the exclusion of others, the media
"primes" certain aspects of political and social life. When citizens make candidate
evaluations, it is these primed topics that are immediately available to them.
Individuals use these primed issues to make judgments about political officials or
political candidates (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). For example, when primed by
television news stories on national defense, citizens are more likely to judge the
president based upon his defense policy. When primed on stories about inflation,
citizens are more likely to judge the president by his economic policy.
Whereas agenda setting is a one-stage process (viewing something on the
media and perceiving it as important), priming is a two-stage process. One must be
exposed to something in the media, store it in his/her memory and then attach it to a
related concept. Because the process by which individuals are primed is different
than agenda setting, priming effects different people than agenda setting. Since
priming requires people to make the connection between the issue and the president's
involvement with the issue, the politically unsophisticated are not as susceptible to its
effects. The politically sophisticated have highly developed schemata that make
cognitive connections between two concepts much easier (Conover and Feldman
1984; Lodge, McGraw, Conover and Feldman 1991; Kuklinski et. al 1991; Lodge and
McGraw 1996). Since the politically sophisticated have the highly developed
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cognitive structure to make difficult connections, it is the highly developed that
experience the most dramatic effects of priming.
Iyengar and Kinder find the implications of priming much more disturbing
than those of agenda setting. Priming suggests that the politically sophisticated-those who are politically informed, involved, and influential-- are also susceptible to
the sway of the media's agenda. Furthermore, priming research demonstrates that
priming is particularly important in primary elections. "Given the horse race focus of
most news reports, primary voters are likely to be heavily primed with information
about the candidates' electability. Voters thus come to favor the candidate that are
viewed as electable" (Ansolabehere et al. 1993: 177).
John Krosnick and Don Kinder (1990) corroborate the priming hypothesis by
demonstrating that after the disclosure of Iran-Contra, citizens were than twice as
likely to judge President Reagan on the basis of American intervention in Central
American than before. Furthermore, Krosnick and Kinder showed the priming effect
was more likely to take place in the judgment of Reagan's political life than in
assessments of his personal character (Krosnick and Kinder 1990).
Using the case of George Bush in 1992, Krosnick and Brannon ( 1993) were
able to show that when the public was "primed" to think about the Gulf War,
evaluations of George Bush improved considerably. After the war ended, however,
the American people were primed by the media to shift their attention from the Gulf
War to the state of the domestic economy. As they were primed to consider a topic
where America was faring somewhat worse, evaluations of George Bush declined.
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Obviously, priming had serious, and possibly fatal effects on George Bush's
presidential election hopes of 1992 (Krosnick and Brannon 1993).
The priming effect, although surprisingly under-researched (Geer and Kahn
1993), has been able to provide us with considerable insight into how media coverage
affects citizen attitudes and behavior. In brief, the priming research program has
demonstrated that when the media cover an issue, it not only impacts the priorities of
the viewer/reader, but this change in priority "primes" the media consumer to alter
her evaluation of a candidate or politician. This too has an important lesson for our
understanding of how state legislators use the media. State legislators should only
seek media coverage on issues that will reflect positively upon them. For instance, if
a legislator supports an issue that is not popular with her constituency, it would be
best to ignore this issue in the legislator's dealings with the media. If the media cover
the issue, the public would most likely evaluate the legislator in the light of the
issue-something she does not want if it is an unpopular issue. Likewise, if a
legislator supports an issue that is quite popular with the public, resources would be
well-spent gaining media coverage on this issue. Also, priming influences the
political informed more than the uninformed. This is particularly important for
legislators. It is likely that priming will have the most profound effect on other
legislators, political elites and informed voters-the audiences primarily important
when trying to pass policy.
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Framing

While both agenda-setting and priming suggest that impact of media on
individuals can be traced to the frequency of stories, framing suggests that the way a
story is covered directly effects how people will perceive and respond to an issue
(Gamson 1992; Gamson and Lasch 1983; Nelson and Kinder 1996). Simply stated,
"Framing is the process by which a communication source constructs and defines a
social or political issue for its audience" (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997: 221).
Framing research began in social psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).
Since then, framing has examined by political communication scholars (Iyengar
1991; Gamson 1992; Gamson and Modiglaiani 1987; Chong 1996). Unfortunately,
as framing has entered the field of political communication, a number of scholars
have subsumed the theory of framing within the larger study of persuasion and
attitude change (Mutz, Sniderman and Brody 1996). This is a mistake. Framing is
conceptually distinct from persuasion and attitude change as it relies on activating
information already stored in the recipient's memory rather than providing new
information as its stimulus for change (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997).
Work by Shanto Iyengar (1991) showed that episodic frames (frames that
focus on individual cases) will result in the viewer blaming individuals rather than
society for the problem or issue in question. In contrast, thematic frames, i.e., those
that focus on social, political and economic forces) cause individuals to see the
subject as societally induced, where individuals are less to blame than uncontrollable
social forces. The way in which individuals view these issues drastically alters the
evaluations of candidates who are elected to solve these problems.
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Tom Nelson and his colleagues have looked at a variety of issues in furthering
development of research in framing. In the first of these, Nelson and Kinder ( 1996)
looked at AIDS policy to better understand the dynamics of framing. They
discovered that frames that focus on the beneficiaries of a particular policy caused
viewers to tie the issue to the beneficiary and therefore evaluate their view of the
policy on their opinion of the group in question.
Next, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) added to the growing body of
framing literature through their study of media framing of a civil liberties conflict.
They, conclude that the frame or angle the media takes on controversy directly effects
citizens perceptions, opinions and actions. The authors suggest that the choice of
media frames directly effects the "willingness to extend civil liberties protections to
ignoble and potentially dangerous groups" (1997: 576).
While the basic framing hypothesis has been corroborated repeatedly, the
effects of framing on different types of people are somewhat more contested. While
Nelson, Oxley and Clawson ( 1997) suggest that the political sophistication of the
recipient should have no effect on the effects of framing; more recent studies have
called this conclusion into question. Goren (1999) found that politically informed
and aware citizens are more susceptible to media framing and its effects.
Research has demonstrated that framing is a powerful phenomenon at work in
American politics. Framing points to the vast impact of the media in shaping today's
policy opinions. While journalists most likely do not intend to frame issues, (Nelson,
Oxley and Clawson 1997), framing is still a powerful force. "These effects may be
wholly unintended, but they are real nonetheless" (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997).
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Framing teaches an important lesson to legislators who seek to gain media
coverage. Media coverage may have unintended consequences. If a journalist (either
consciously or unconsciously) "frames" a story in a different light that the legislator
intends, the public reaction may be different than the legislator intends. The alternate
frame may even cost a legislator her job. In short, framing demonstrates that media
coverage is not always positive for a legislator. Media coverage may have
(unintended) negative consequences. Wise state legislators understand that gaining
media coverage is not without its risks.
At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that legislators use media to
influence people's opinions, attitudes and information. What I left unexamined in
that section, however, was the assumption that people can learn from the media.
Here, I addressed that assumption. I conclude that people can in fact learn from the
media. After tremendous scholarly debate, it appears that media content does impact
people's attitudes, priorities and opinions. In particular, I find that media coverage
can change the vote choice of a small percentage of the public. The agenda setting
literature demonstrates conclusively that the media set priorities for the public. The
priming literature suggests that people evaluate candidates based on their stance on
the issues covered on the news. Therefore, a legislator who holds a popular position
on an issue would be well served to see that issue covered on the media. Finally, the
framing literature suggests that how a story is covered can seriously influence
people's beliefs on the issue. Next, I move into a discussion of how media tactics
impact legislative representation in the states.
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Representation
State legislators are elected to represent their constituents. Although there is
tremendous debate about the best means of representation (See, for example, Pitkin
1967), representation is doubtless a vital component of the American federal system.
While the term representation encompasses a variety of things, it is best understood
as:
... acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them.
The representative must act independently; his action must involve discretion
and judgment; he must be the one who acts. The represented must also be
(conceived as) capable of independent action and judgment, not merely being
taken care of. And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between
representative and represented about what is to be done, that conflict must not
normally take place. The representative must act in such a way that there is
no conflict, or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found
persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in
terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not
in accord with their interest (Pitkin 1967: 209-210).
There is a tremendous amount of literature on representation. Representation
has been examined in the city council (Eulau and Prewitt 1973), Congress (Fenno
1978) and of course, in the abstract (Pitkin 1967). Although many studies of state
legislatures have important implications for representation (e.g. Rosenthal 1981;
Richardson and Freeman 1995; Freeman and Richardson 1996; Rosenthal 1998) the
seminal study of representation in the state legislature is undoubtedly Malcolm
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Jewell's classic, Representation in State Legislatures (1982). According to Jewell,
there are four essential components of representation: communicating with
constituents, policy responsiveness, allocation of resources for the district, and
service to constituents. Certainly, every part of this process is essential to
understanding what interests get represented in the state legislature and why. It is
outside the scope of this study, however, to examine each of these components in
depth. Instead, I seek to understand how the media plays a role in this process.
Specifically, I posit that the media play a key role in the first and second components
of this process--communicating with constituents, and policy responsiveness. The
second two components-allocation of resources for the district, and service to
constituents, can best be understood as the output of this system of representation.
While the role of the media may play a role determining the output, the media is not
directly involved in this stage of the process of representation. Below, I review each
of the four components and specify the role the media plays in each. For the reasons
discussed previously, I will spend the majority of my time on the first two
components.

Communicating With Constituents
For this type of representation to occur, legislators must be available and
accessible to their constituents. They must publicize their office hours, phone
numbers, e-mails addresses, etc. They must tell constituents how they voted and
why. They must convince their constituents that they are serving their interests. In
short.just as members of Congress must explain Washington activity (Fenno 1978),
state legislators must explain state capital activity. This can be done in a number of
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ways. For example, many legislators send out newsletters to their constituents.
Others send other forms of direct mail, while some send out mass e-mails. Still
others engage in old-style retail politics-what used to be known as "pressing the
flesh." While none of these methods can be ignored, I am most interested in
legislators seeking, courting and getting media coverage. This may be accomplished
in many ways. A legislator may write editorials, stage a "psuedo-event" (Boorstein
1962), appear on public access cable, or purchase advertising space. Finally, a
legislator may contact reporters and journalists. In short, legislators may engage in
the "negotiation of newsworthiness" that Timothy Cook finds so prevalent in the
United States Congress ( 1989; 1998). Regardless of the form it takes, media exposure
allows a legislator to communicate with a large number of constituents at one time.
The cost is generally low and the pay off is often substantial. Still, there is risk in this
mode of communication. Legislators do not have total control over the final product
and journalists may impose their own opinions on the story. In short, the story may
not come out favorably for the legislator. Still, mere mention in the news can often
do wonders for a legislator's electoral hopes. 2 Unfortunately, we know little else
about how state legislators use the media in this capacity. While many have
suggested that media play a role (Jewell 1982; Rosenthal 1998), no one knows
exactly how. In chapter 3, I address this question.
Policy Responsiveness
The second component of representation refers to the congruence between
constituent opinion and legislator action. Alongside casework, acquisition of
2 For instance, Brady and Theriault (2000) find that each mention in the New York Times translates to
a $3000 increase in a Senator's campaign coffers
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resources and the projection of concern, policy congruence is one part of the
representative-constituency linkage (Rosenthal 1998: 11). Generally speaking, a
legislator is considered responsive on policy issues if her views and voting behavior
are consistently aligned with the opinions expressed by her constituents (see for
example, Poole and Rosenthal 1991). Unfortunately, there is no sure-fire way to
"know" the opinions of constituents. If a legislator miscalculates what constituent
opinion is on an issue, she may vote or act in a way incongruent with the wishes of
their constituents. This may have dire electoral consequences. In order to be
responsive and avoid electoral defeat, legislators use a number of different tactics to
gauge constituent opinion.
First, a legislator can conduct public opinion polls. This is a fairly
straightforward way to know constituent opinion. Essentially, this requires the
legislator or member of the legislative staff to construct a survey instrument asking a
number of questions on various policy issues. The survey instrument is then mailed
to constituents who are instructed to mail the survey back 3 . Alternatively, the survey
may be administered by telephone. While this may be gaining prominence as a way
of knowing public opinion, it is still fraught with problems. First, legislators often
have difficulty obtaining an adequate response rate (Jewell 1982). Second, many
legislators question the accuracy of public opinion polls. Even if a legislator is
convinced the poll was administered properly and its results are accurate, the results
are still time-bound. In other words, the picture of public opinion provided in a
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This may be aimed at the entire district, or may instead seek the opinions of a specific constituency.
As Fenno ( 1978) found, legislators react to and are concerned with the opinion of various constituency
to varying degrees.

53

survey or poll may be due to a temporary condition or occurrence. Third, and most
importantly, properly conducted public opinion polls are extremely expensive. Often,
a legislator may have little money to spend on finding out what public opinion is on
an issue. For these reasons, the use of surveys and polls to know constituent opinion
is used very infrequently (Herbst 1998).
The second way a legislator may know public opinion is through organized
interests. In her study of the Illinois state legislature, Susan Herbst ( 1998) found that
legislative staff members often use the communications of organized interests as a
proxy for public opinion. While a number of factors may account for this reliance on
organized interest opinion, Herbst suggests that it is primarily because they
communicate clearly and efficiently, they are considered honest, and they can often
communicate the intensity of opinion on any given issue. Moreover, lobbyists are
extremely well informed about their issues, and understand what legislators want to
know and in what form they want to know it. According to Herbst, "They [organized
interests] translate opinion, but during this translation process they also help to give
public opinion a more solid and comprehensible form. Lobbyists are perceived to
crystallize or clarify the content and intensity of vague public moods" (Herbst 1998:
53).
Third, a legislator may use phone calls received from constituents as an
indicator of public opinion. This too may be fraught with problems. Legislators have
no way of knowing whether the opinions expressed through phone calls accurately
reflect the opinion of the district in general, or the opinions of a few individuals.
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Generally speaking, phone calls are discounted as a way to know district opinion or
public opinion in general (Herbst 1998).
Fourth, and most importantly for this study, legislators often use media
content as a means of learning about public opinion. Many respondents in Herbst's
study, expressed the belief that "mass media content is public opinion" (1998: 64).
According to Herbst, "All [of the staffers interviewed] believed that newspaper,
television or radio content was not simply a conduit for public opinion express: in
their view, it is the very essence of public opinion and can support or destroy
legislative initiatives" (Herbst 1998: 65). As state legislatures become more
professional (King 2000) and legislators spend more time in the state capital, many
legislators must rely on media content as a surrogate for public opinion. Certainly,
this places a heavy burden on statehouse journalists-individuals not elected by the
people. While Herbst's study has suggested that this occurs, we know little about the
ways in which it occurs. Chapter 4 addresses this issue.
Allocation of Resources For District and Service To Constituents
The last two components of legislative representation are the output of
legislative representation. Simply stated, they are the "stuff' of politics. Providing
resources and service for constituents is how legislators keep their jobs. If they
become known as adept in this respect, they may stay in office for decades. If they
are unable to "bring home the bacon," they may quickly be looking for new
employment. While the media do not play a direct role in the output itself, they do
play a significant role in determining what the outcome is. Interest in the process
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leading up to the allocation of resources and services to constituents is what drives
this study.
Figure 2 depicts the process of representation in the states. To summarize,
representation consists of: communicating with constituents, policy responsiveness,
allocation of resources for the district, and service to constituents (Jewell 1982).
While each and every component of legislative representation is vitally important, I
address only those that relate specifically to the media~ommunicating with
constituents and policy responsiveness. There are a number of ways of
communicating with constituents, including through direct mail, through retail
politics, and through newsletters. Although all of these means of communicating
with constituents are important, I am only concerned with how legislators use the
media to communicate with constituents. Likewise, there are a number of ways for
legislators to achieve policy responsiveness. I am only concerned with how
legislators use media content to "know public opinion" and achieve policy
responsiveness. While this narrow focus does not give us a complete understanding
of representation, it does give us a more complete understanding of the role of the
media in the process of representation. This is tum illuminates parts of the puzzle of
representation in the states. Future studies examining the changing nature of
representation in the states should use the results obtained here in placing the media
in this larger framework of representation.
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Alan Rosenthal and the Changing Nature of Legislative Representation in the States
The question remains, how is representation changing in the states? Alan
Rosenthal suggests that there has been a tremendous change in the nature of
representation in state legislatures. While the country was founded to value the
republican principle of representative democracy, Rosenthal argues that in recent
years we have moved away from this ideal and towards a more participatory
democracy. Most importantly for this dissertation, Rosenthal suggests that this
"decline in representative democracy" is largely a function of the rise in the use of
polling, constituency contact and media tactics by state legislatures. This has a
number of deleterious effects including the danger of manipulation, the danger of less
deliberation and the weakening of the state legislature. According to Rosenthal, this
could lead to a system of governance where governors have increasing and
overwhelming power. This "unchecked power" is certainly contrary to the wishes of
Madison, Hamilton and the like.
In sum, Rosenthal suggests that media tactics along with other means of
achieving legislative goals have resulted in a decline of representative democracy.
Unfortunately, Rosenthal provides little data to demonstrate whether legislators use
media tactics, much less which legislators use media tactics. Hopefully my results
can help inform Rosenthal's discussion and thus impact our understanding of the
changing nature of representation in the states.
Conclusion
From this chapter we now know that the media can be used to achieve reelection,
good public policy and power inside the legislature. Next, we know that using the
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media for these purposes is potentially fruitful. Finally, we know that like most
studies of legislative behavior, this study has implications for representation. Indeed,
if legislators use media, the traditional definitions of representation may no longer
apply as there are well-established biases built into the process of newsgathering and
newsmaking. These biases may severely alter the message being communicated from
legislator to citizen and vice-versa.
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CHAPTER Ill:
THE MEDIA ENTERPRISE IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE

In previous chapters, I established that in order to better understand how legislators
attain their legislative goals of reelection, good public policy and power within the
legislature, we must obtain a better understanding of how state legislators and the
media interact. In this chapter I begin to review my findings about this relationship.
First, I discuss the questions and hypotheses that guide the analysis in this chapter.
Then, I review the findings. Finally, I discuss the conclusions of this chapter and
discuss implications for our understanding of both state legislatures and political
communication.
Questions and Hypotheses

I seek to answer a number of questions regarding the relationship between state
legislators and the media. First, I ask the most basic question: do state legislators use
media tactics? Although a few studies suggest that the answer is yes (Fico 1984;
Lynch 1999), the studies that ask this question generally examine only one legislature
and are quite dated. The question certainly deserves to be revisited. Next, I seek to
find out how state legislators and members of Congress differ in their use of media
tactics. I use Kedrowski' s (1996) typology of media entrepreneurship to answer this
question. Considering that members of Congress are covered more often than state
legislators and have much larger press offices, I hypothesize that fewer state
legislators are media entrepreneurs than members of Congress.
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I also seek to find out how media tactics compare to more traditional means of
legislating. In particular I ask how frequently legislators engage in media tactics
(appearing on television news, writing op-eds, issuing press releases, and appearing
on public access television) as opposed to traditional means of legislating (contacting
other legislators directly, proposing legislation, contacting government agencies,
contacting governor's office, speaking on the floor, meeting with lobbyists and
meeting with the party caucus). I also ask, how effective do legislators consider the
above activities? In other words, are the tactics legislators use the same as the ones
they feel are most effective?
Our understanding of the media-state legislature relationship would be
incomplete without asking whom state legislators seek to reach with their media
strategies. Some scholars have suggested that legislators often use the media to reach
other legislators and members of the policy community (Kedrowski 1996), while
others suggest they aim only to reach constituents with their media efforts (Hess
1991). I will weigh in on this debate in the state legislature.
Next, I ask: Who uses the media? In other words, what factors predict
whether a legislator perceives media as a useful and effective outlet for their
resources? I include eight independent variables to examine this relationship: gender,
age, majority party/minority party, chamber, leadership, electoral vulnerability, media
market congruence, and state. I also employ each of the above variables in a model
predicting the frequency with which a legislator will use media tactics. Although I
would hypothesize that the same factors would predict both effectiveness and
frequency, no studies have compared how effective legislators view media tactics to
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how often they engage in the same activities. In other words, I would expect that if a
legislator feels a certain media tactic is effective, she would also be more likely to use
that same tactic. Below, I review each independent variable, its hypothesized
relationship to a legislator's use of the media, as well and how each independent
variable is coded.

Independent Variables
State. One advantage of studying state legislatures is that they provide a
number of different institutional contexts to test theories and hypotheses. In this
study, I examine the media activities and attitudes of legislators in California, Georgia
and Iowa. These legislatures vary on a number of different dimensions. For
example, California state legislators are more professional and have more resources at
their disposal. Each California legislator also represents far more people than does
each legislator in Georgia and Iowa. For these reasons, I hypothesize that California
state legislators are more apt to use the media than legislators in Georgia and Iowa. I
include a dummy variable for California (l= California legislator; 0= not California
legislator) and a dummy variable for Georgia ( !=Georgia legislator: 0= not Georgia
legislator).

Gender. Unfortunately, few studies examine how female politicians are
covered once they are elected (Carroll and Schreiber 1997). Those studies that have
addressed the issue suggest that stories about women often focus on trivial issues
(Witt, Paget and Matthews 1994). When they do cover policy, they tend to cover
traditional "women's issues" such as health and abortion and ignore other policy
issues where women may be influential (Carroll and Schreiber 1997). Although not
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directly related to the issue of how female officer holders are covered by media,
scholars have also established that female candidates are covered less often than male
candidates when running for office. When women are covered, stories tend to focus
more on their viability as candidates than on issues or substantive policy positions
(Kahn 1994; Kahn 1996; Kahn and Goldberg 1991). In sum, the available research
suggests that coverage of female politicians is generally less frequent and less
substantive than coverage of male politicians. From this, I hypothesize that women
will use media tactics less frequently than their male counterparts. This is a
dichotomous variable (l=male, 0=female).
Age. There is often a picture of media entrepreneurs as predominately young
legislators. Kedrowski concludes that, "Media entrepreneurs are younger, but not
necessarily junior members of Congress" (Kedrowski 1996: 50). In a partially
contradictory finding, Stephen Hess (1986) concluded that the Senators who receive
the most coverage are "fast approaching sixty years of age and are in their third
term ... " (1986:29). Hess does note, however, that his finding is probably more a
function of tenure than age. I seek to find if whether age is a significant factor in
predicting a state legislator's attitude towards the media. Here I hypothesize that,
controlling for other factors, younger legislators will be more likely to be media
entrepreneurs. Instead of creating a continuous variable with a value for each age, I
divided each legislator's age into one of four categories (1=65 & older; 2= 50-64; 3=
34-49; 4= below 34 ).

Majority party/ Minority party. Cook (1989), and Kedrowski (1996) found
that legislators often use the media as a means to impact the legislative agenda while
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circumventing formal channels. In other words, using the media may provide
members of the minority party with a way to influence legislation regardless of
whether their party is in power. Considering these findings, I hypothesize that state
legislators who are a member of the minority party are more likely to use the media
than legislators who are members of the majority party. This is a dichotomous
variable (!=majority party; 0= minority party).
Leadership. Newscasts and newspapers have limited time and space to devote
to government news coverage. As a result, certain legislators are generally
considered more newsworthy than others. Stephen Hess ( 1986) concluded that
among those who are more newsworthy are senators who occupy leadership
positions. These senators are more visible and lend credibility to discussion of issues
under their purview. Keeping with these findings, I hypothesize that members of the
leadership will be more likely to use media and feel positively inclined towards media
relations than members not in leadership. Leadership is a dichotomous variable
(!=legislative or party leader; 0= not a legislative or party leader).
Media Market Congmence. "Media market congruence refers to the degree of
overlap between a television market and a legislative district" (Hogan 1997: 557).
This has been used to predict mass media advertising (Hogan 1997), and constituent
knowledge of representatives (Campbell, Alford and Henry 1984; Lipinski 2001).
Each legislative district was given a score of congruence ranging from 1-100. A
score of 1 signifies that the district does not line up well with the media market. A
score of 100 would suggest that the media market and legislative district have
identical boundaries. For the media market information, I relied on the Broadcasting
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and Cable Yearbook. For details on how to create the congruence score, see Hogan
(1997), and Campbell, Alford and Henry (1984). While this does not measure the
level of congruence between state legislative districts and print media markets, it does
provide a rough estimate, as generally print and electronic media markets are similar.
I hypothesize that legislators whose districts are highly congruent with the media
market will find it easier to gamer media coverage and thus will engage in media
tactics more often. Likewise, if a legislator's district crosses into a number of
different media markets and is thus incongruent, she will likely see the media as a less
effective and less efficient means of reaching constituents than if her district is
contained within one media market.

Electoral Vulnerability. Undoubtedly, reelection is one major reason legislators (and
all politicians, for that matter) use media tactics. Given this, if a legislator is coming
off of a tight race, she should be more likely to use media tactics to communicate
with her constituents on a regular basis. This variable is measured as the percent of
the vote the legislator received in the last election in which she ran. I gathered this
information from the web sites for the California, Georgia and Iowa boards of
elections.
Results

It is often assumed that media strategies are an increasingly important part of
legislative behavior in the states. Alan Rosenthal recently stated, "The urge to play to
the media is practically irresistible" (1998:109). The following section will assess the
validity of this statement and describe what factors affect whether a state legislator is
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an active "media entrepreneur" (Kedrowski 1996) or a low-profile member who
shirks media and public relations tactics for more traditional methods of legislating.
The first four questions of the survey ask how legislators feel about using the
media in the policy process. Table 4 shows the results of these questions. The data
suggest that state legislators have a generally positive attitude toward the use of
media strategies. For example, over half of the respondents either strongly agree or
agree that state legislators often solicit media exposure; that soliciting media exposure
is a particularly effective way of putting an issue on the legislative agenda; that media
exposure is an effective way to convince other legislators to support policy proposals;
and that media exposure is an effective way to stimulate discussion on policy
alternatives. Combined, these results suggest that state legislators, like their
congressional counterparts, often use media strategies as a tool for legislating. These
data also paint a clear picture of differences between states. California state
legislators agree and strongly agree with these statements much more often than their
counterparts in Georgia and Iowa. Most remarkably, 100% of the California
legislators who responded to the survey indicated that members often solicit media
exposure as a way to stimulate discussion about policy proposals. While the media
seem to be players in legislative politics in all three states surveyed, media tactics
seem to be most pervasive in California.
On the basis of their responses to the first four questions, respondents were
then placed into one of four categories: traditional legislators, pool of potential media

entrepreneurs, likely media entrepreneurs, and hard-core media entrepreneurs. The
categories and scoring that corresponds to each category are consistent with
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Kedrowski's (1996) study of the media and Congress. The pool of media
entrepreneurs consists of legislators whose average responses to the first four
questions score 4.0 or higher (on a five point scale). Although Kedrowski's (1996)
survey is geared towards legislative staff, I believe this comparison is warranted.
First, Kedrowski instructs her respondents to answer in relation to the legislator's
opinion and the legislator's activity. Second, as she notes, "almost without exception,
staff mirror the member's philosophy, approach, and values" (1996: 18). Although
not a perfect comparison, my survey questions are virtually identical to those posed
by Kedrowski. Furthermore, Kedrowski's data are some of the only data available
for comparison. Comparing these scores can give us a unique look at the differences
between media tactics of state legislators as opposed to the media tactics employed in
Congress. Likely media entrepreneurs were labeled as those legislators who scored
4.25 and above, while hard-core media entrepreneurs are defined as those who
average a response score of 4.5 and above. By combining the first four questions of
the survey and developing a scale of "attitude toward using the media," I find that
state legislators have similar but slightly less positive attitudes towards using media
than members of Congress. While 49 percent of state legislators are potential media
entrepreneurs, 53.6 percent of members of Congress can be categorized as such
(Kedrowski 1996). Likely media entrepreneurs make up 25 percent of state
legislators surveyed, compared with 28.5 percent of members of Congress
(Kedrowski 1996). Finally, 19 percent of state legislators are categorized as hardcore media entrepreneurs compared to 22 percent of members of Congress
(Kedrowski 1996). Together, these findings suggest that state legislators have a
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generally positive attitude towards using the media to further their policy goals, but
are still less positive than their congressional counterparts. With the proliferation of
media as a source for political knowledge, it is not surprising that state legislators rate
the media as an effective way to further their policy goals. Samuel Kernell (1986)
suggests that when political institutions become more individualized, the members
are more likely to engage in media strategies. Obviously, the state legislature is a
much less individualized body than Congress. Far fewer citizens can identify their
state legislator than their member of Congress (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Thus,
it stands to reason that although state legislators do use the media, they are less likely
to use media strategies than their congressional counterparts

Types of Media Activities
Certain activities require a legislator to expend tremendous resources and undertake
great risk, while others involve little effort and risk. This section addresses how often
state legislators engage in specific media activities. Likewise, I compare the
frequency of individual media activities to more traditional means of legislating.
Each legislator was asked two questions about media tactics (including:
writing op-ed articles, appearing on television programs, issuing press releases, and
appearing on public access television) and traditional modes of legislating (including:
contacting other legislators directly, proposing legislation, contacting government
agencies, contacting the governor's office, speaking on the floor, meeting with
lobbyists, and meeting with the party caucus). For each tactic, the respondent was
asked to indicate how frequently she engages in that activity as well as how effective
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she believes that activity to be. Responses for the frequency questions were coded as
follows:
4= The legislator frequently engages in that activity.
3= The legislator engages in that activity occasionally.
2= The legislator rarely engages in that activity.
l= The legislator never engages in that particular activity.
The results are displayed in Table 5.
I find that traditional means of legislating are still the most popular.
Legislators claim they contact other legislators, meet with lobbyists, meet with their
party's caucus, and propose legislation more often than they engage in any media
activity. Not surprisingly, issuing press releases is the most frequently utilized media
activity. State legislators issue press releases more often than they engage in some
traditional modes of legislating, including speaking on the floor and contacting the
governor's office. Writing op-ed articles appears next, followed by appearing on
television news, and appearing on public access cable. In short, although state
legislators engage in media activities, these activities are still less prevalent than more
traditional means of legislating. This is consistent with the literature on media and
Congress, which suggests that while media activities are increasingly important to
politicians (Cook 1998; Sparrow 1999), they are not used at the expense of more
traditional activities (Kedrowski 1996).
When comparing the results from each state, we once again get the picture
that California state legislators are more media savvy than their counterparts in Iowa
and Georgia. In particular, California legislators claim they appear on televised
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media and public access television more often than Iowa or Georgia legislators. This
is somewhat surprising considering the size of many of California's media markets.
It is much more difficult to attract the attention of television and newspapers in large
media markets such as Los Angeles and San Francisco.
While the above discussion gives an overview of how frequently legislators in
various states use media tactics, it does not discuss whether legislators believe these
tactics are effective. Legislators were also asked about the effectiveness of the same
activities as discussed above. Responses were coded as follows:
4= The legislator rates the activity as very effective.
3= The legislator rates the activity as effective.
2= The legislator rates the activity as somewhat effective.
l= The legislator rates the activity as not effective.
Average results are displayed in Table 6.
Legislators indicate that writing op-eds, and appearing on public access
television are the most effective media tactics. Legislators believe that these two
tactics are more effective than most traditional tactics of legislating. This stands in
stark contrast to the data regarding the frequency of media usage. For instance, while
state legislators engage in most traditional means of legislating more than media
tactics, they generally see media tactics as being more effective than their traditional
counterparts. There are a number of possible explanations for this disconnect. First,
it is entirely possible that legislators wish to use media more often, but they simply do
not have the resources. The data seem to back up this conclusion. California
legislators generally see media tactics as no more effective than do their counterparts
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in Georgia and Iowa. Nonetheless, they engage in media activities more often.
While it is possible that California media are simply more apt to cover state politics
and state politicians, this would conflict with the majority of the literature on media
and politics which suggests that media outlets display similar news-gathering routines
and vary little in the types of stories they cover.

Whom Are Legislators Trying to Reach With Their Media Strategies?
This paper has shown that state legislators do in fact engage in media activities, but
engage in these activities less than traditional forms of legislating. My next research
question asks: Whom are state legislators trying to reach with their media efforts? To
address this question, I asked respondents the following question, "Many members of
the state legislature use strategies such as writing op-ed articles and conducting
interviews with reporters to publicize their ideas and policy positions. In your
opinion, whom are these members trying to reach through these efforts? Check all
that apply." The results of this question are displayed in Figure 3.
Not surprisingly, the bulk of media efforts are aimed at a legislator's
constituency. As one legislator commented, "the main purpose of the media for state
legislators is to inform constituents of issues and results of actions." Interest groups
and the public outside the constituency are next. It appears that state legislators also
attempt to reach other legislators with their media activities. Over half of all
respondents indicated that their media efforts are at least partly aimed at other
legislators, both in their party and in the other party. Party leaders and officials in the
Governor's office are next. In addition, over 36 percent of respondents indicate that
one of their target audiences for media activities is other media. This is consistent
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with the conclusions of congressional scholars who suggest that members of
Congress often aim their media activities at other media, thus spawning increased
coverage and more publicity (Kedrowski 1996).
These data show first and foremost that state legislators aim to reach
constituents with their media activities. The story does not end here, however.
Legislators may also engage in media activities to reach a variety of audiences,
primarily in the capital community. While Stephen Hess ( 1986) contends that most
legislators shun using media activities to reach the capital community, this conclusion
does not appear to apply in the state legislature. Legislators' media activities may be
aimed primarily at their constituents, but they also clearly wish to reach other
legislators and other policy elites. Indeed, the data suggest that media are used to
reach a variety of audiences. While constituents may be the largest intended
audience, they are not the only one. Future studies should recognize this.
Which Legislators Use Media Tactics?
Using Ordinary Least Squares regression, I next examine what factors determine how
effective legislators believes media tactics will be, as well as how frequently they use
those tactics. Please see Appendix C for a description of Ordinary Least Squares
regression. Separate models were run for questions asking legislators about
frequency as well as effectiveness. Models were also run for all states together, as
well as for each state individually. To create the variable for models referring to
frequency, I combined answers to a question stating, "Legislators may engage in a
variety of activities in order to achieve their policy goals. Please indicate how often
you engage in each of the following activities." The dependent variable for the
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questions asking about effectiveness is the combined results from a question asking
"In your opinion, what is the relative effectiveness of each of the following activities
for furthering your policy goals?" The results of both are displayed in Table 7.
The data presented in Table 7 support a resource definition of media usage. It
appears that legislators who have more resources will use media tactics more often.
In the clearest demonstration of this, it appears that California legislators are more
likely to engage in media tactics, but are no more likely than other legislators to
believe that their media activities are effective. California legislators have more staff,
are in session longer, and have more money to spend on media activities. Their
increased experience with the media does not appear to cause them to see these
strategies as more effective than legislators in other states who may engage in the
media enterprise less often. This suggests that it is in fact the availability of
resources, rather than differences in perceived effectiveness that result in more or less
frequent use of the media. This stands in contrast to previous work in political
communication that suggests that legislators use media as a way to compensate for a
large gap between expectations and resources (Cook 1998). Lending extra credence
to this resource definition of media use is the fact that the media market variable is
not significant in any of the models. It thus seems to be the resources afforded
California legislators, rather than the congruence of media markets that determines
the frequency with which state legislators use media tactics.
Leadership is not significant in any of the models. This is surprising
considering the findings of congressional scholars that leadership is an important
variable in predicting media entrepreneurship (Kedrowski 1996) and frequency of
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media coverage (Theriault and Brady 2000). When one considers the nature of
legislative leadership in the states, it becomes less surprising, however. There are
many more leadership positions in the state legislature than in Congress (Rosenthal
1998). While oftentimes these leadership positions entail little more than an official
title, the sheer number of legislative leaders makes each individual leader much less
newsworthy.
While gender is not a significant predictor of how often a legislator will
engage in specific media activities, it appears that female state legislators are more
likely than males to perceive media activities as effective. While this relationship is
significant for all states, it is not significant for any of the three states considered
alone. Nonetheless, the direction of the relationship is consistent for all three states.
By breaking up the data by type of media activity, it appears that female legislators
find issuing press releases, appearing on public access television and appearing on
network television more effective than other types of media activities. It appears that
female legislators have chosen modes of media relations that give them more control.
Legislators have more control over the tone, content, and presentation on public
access television than in other media outlets. Likewise, a legislator would likely have
more control over his appearance on a network television program than they would
over their appearance on other forms of media. Finally, press releases are a
legislator's best attempt to "spin" a news story a certain way. Even if taken out of
context, it is unlikely that a press release could hurt a state legislator. In sum, it
appears that the media tactics women find most effective are the ones they have most
control over.
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Once the models are broken up by state, few patterns appear. Urban is
negatively significant for the California effectiveness model, but for no other models.
Age is significant for the Georgia frequency model, but for no others. In all, it

appears that when one controls for resources, little else can adequately predict how
frequently state legislators use media tactics, or how they feel about their
effectiveness. These data provide a unique and intuitively appealing way to look at
how often legislators engage in media activities that cannot be seen in cross-sectional
data of Congress. By looking at different state contexts and controlling for alternative
causes, we see a picture of media usage that suggests simply: as resources rise,
legislators' use of media tactics will also rise. Certainly, this hypothesis deserves to
be revisited in future studies. In particular, scholars should test this hypothesis using

more states. The supreme importance of resources also suggests that as states
continue to professionalize (King 2000), legislators will increase their use of media
tactics.
When Do State Legislators Use Media Tactics?
We have demonstrated conclusively that legislators use the media first and foremost
to communicate with constituents. Not to be discounted, however, is the finding that
legislators also use the media to communicate with a variety of other audiences. This
section will discuss in further detail when state legislators use the media to affect the
policy process. Certainly, agenda setting provides the most obvious place for
legislators to attempt to affect the process by utilizing media strategies. Indeed, the
power to control what alternatives are under consideration is the most important
"face" of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1972). Agenda setting also marks the place in
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the policy process where people's opinions are most malleable. As discussed in
Chapter 2, when individuals are exposed to stories on the media, they are more likely
to believe those stories are important (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Agenda setting thus
provides a logical place for legislators to use the media. The following section will
try to find out if this is the only place in the policy process where state legislators use
the media.
Each legislator was asked, "The media may be used at various stages in the
legislative process. How often do you solicit media attention for each of the
following stages of the policy process (4=Frequently; 3=0ccasionally, 2=Rarely,
l=Never)?" The results are displayed in Table 8.
The results are fairly surprising. While legislators are most likely to use
media in the agenda setting stage of the policy process ("to raise awareness of a
problem; to place an item on the agenda") (mean=2.9), they are almost as likely to
use the media in other stages of the policy process. There is little deviation between
each of the response categories. The mean score deviates by less than half a point
(.43) from the highest to the lowest response category. Furthermore, the categories
each have a median score of 3. The similar scores for each category suggested that
that legislators do not make much differentiation between using the media enterprise
at each of the different stages of the policy process.
These data suggest that legislators who use the media in the policy process
will utilize the media enterprise at virtually any stage of the policy process. Despite
evidence that affecting the process is much more difficult after the agenda is set and
the alternatives are defined (Kedrowski 1996), legislators seem to be equally apt to
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use the media to move a bill through the committee as define the agenda. Two
explanations emerge as plausible.
The first explanation suggests that the policy process is not a linear set of
steps such as I have presented. Legislators do not differentiate between the various
states of the policy process. Under this view, the data support a "garbage can" model
of the policy process. This model is based on the assumption that the policy process
is fraught with ambiguity. According to Cohen, March and Olsen (1972), decisionmaking in complex organizations is not predictable and linear, but instead can best be
understood as taking place in "organized anarchies" where decisions in these
"organized anarchies" are not made as a function of clearly delineated processes, but
rather by a confluence of four streams. The first of these streams is a problem stream,
containing all possible problems in the universe of the organization. The second is a
potential solution stream, containing ideas an organization proposes or things they
want done. These may or may not have a specific problem associated with them.
Third is a stream of participants. The fourth stream is a stream of choice
opportunities that may bring together solutions with problems. These four streams
are always flowing, when they happen to meet, a decision may occur. If they meet in
the proper place at the proper time, a "good" decision may occur. Under a garbage
can model, legislators make little distinction between various "stages" of the policy
process. Indeed, some stages may exist in some policy domains, and may not exist in
another. Likewise, the order of these stages may vary drastically for different
policies. In a garbage can model, legislators would not use the media to varying
degrees in different stages because they do not see the distinction between these
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stages. Instead, the use of media tactics in the policy process is a much less
predictable, planned process and is much more uneven and opportunistic.
A second, and not incompatible explanation suggests that either legislators do
or do not have the resources to expend on media strategies. Legislators have
available resources do consistently use the media in the policy process, regardless of
the circumstances, while those who do not have the proper resources at their disposal
avoid the media enterprise. This "resource definition of media usage" does not
depend on a legislator to feel that the practice will be particularly useful for them to
use the media enterprise. Rather, if they have the resources at their disposal, they will
use them.

What Have We Learned?
This chapter begins to shed light on an understudied aspect of legislative behavior-how and why state legislators use media tactics. It has produced a number of key
findings. First, the data suggest that media tactics are important in state legislatures,
although not as important as they are in Congress. Although legislators may use the
media in electoral situations (Hogan 1997), using the media is not a completely
electoral enterprise. State legislators also use the media to further their policy goals
by reaching constituents, policy elites and other media.
Most importantly, I find that just because a legislator finds media tactics
effective, she wi11 not necessarily use them. Controlling for other possible causes, it
appears that legislators who have more resources at their disposal will use media
tactics more often, while those with less resources will use media tactics less
frequently. This has important implications for our understanding of media and
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politics. It appears that "the urge to play to the media is practically irresistible"
(Rosenthal 1998: 109), only if a legislator is given the proper institutional support.
As state legislators continue to become more professional, I expect that their use of
media tactics will increase. While this could increase constituent knowledge of their
legislator, it can also have deleterious effects. In particular, Alan Rosenthal suggests
that the increasing use of the media by state legislators is one indication of a larger
"decline of representative democracy." My findings suggest that Rosenthal's fears
will become increasingly salient.
Next, I find that while state legislators do indeed engage in media activities,
traditional forms of legislating are still more prevalent. It appears that the use of
media strategies augments rather than replaces a legislator's "bag of legislative
tricks." Among media activities and strategies, issuing press releases is the most
popular. Media activities that require more time and resources are generally avoided
in deference to those that require expending fewer resources. The data also suggest
that state legislators direct the majority of their media activities at their constituents.
This does not tell the entire story, however. Over half of the respondents stated that
they also seek to reach other legislators both in their own party as well as the
opposing party. Interest groups, as well as the public outside of their constituency,
are also prime targets of media activities. The traditional belief that legislators are
only concerned with reaching constituents with their media tactics appears to be false.
State legislators have a variety of audiences in mind for their media tactics. Studies
that focus solely on constituent media relations provide a rather shortsighted view of
media strategies. Future studies should recognize this and continue to examine how
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state legislators use media to communicate with a variety of audiences. Finally,
despite the assumptions of other legislative scholars (Cook 1988; Kedrowski 1996),
state legislators are no more likely to use the media to set the agenda and define
alternatives than they are in other stages of the policy process.

Implications For Representation
Chapter 2 established that in order to fully understand representation in the states, we
must gain a better understanding of how state legislators interact with the media.
This chapter has shed some light on this issue. Specifically, we have learned more
about one specific component of legislative representation-communicating with
constituents. It seems that state legislators use the media as one way to communicate
with constituents. Although there are a number of different ways to gain media
coverage, legislators make use of press releases most often.
This study begins to shed light on an understudied aspect of legislative
behavior-how and why state legislators use media tactics. It has produced a number
of key findings. First, the data suggest that media tactics are important in state
legislatures, although not as important as they are in Congress. Although legislators
may use the media in electoral situations (Hogan 1997), using the media is not a
completely electoral enterprise. State legislators also use the media to further their
policy goals by reaching constituents, policy elites and other media.
Most importantly, I find that just because a legislator finds media tactics
effective, she will not necessarily use them. Controlling for other possible causes, it
appears that legislators who have more resources at their disposal will use media
tactics more often, while those with less resources will use media tactics less
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frequently. This has important implications for our understanding of media and
politics. It appears that "the urge to play to the media is practically irresistible"
(Rosenthal 1998: 109), only if a legislator is given the proper institutional support.
As state legislators continue to become more professional, I expect that their use of
media tactics will increase. While this could increase constituent knowledge of their
legislator, it can also have deleterious effects. In particular, Alan Rosenthal suggests
that the increasing use of the media by state legislators is one indication of a larger
"decline of representative democracy." My findings suggest that Rosenthal's fears
will become increasingly salient.
Next, I find that while state legislators do indeed engage in media activities,
traditional forms of legislating are still more prevalent. It appears that the use of
media strategies augments rather than replaces a legislator's "bag of legislative
tricks." Among media activities and strategies, issuing press releases is the most
popular. Media activities that require more time and resources are generally avoided
in deference to those that require expending fewer resources. The data also suggest
that state legislators direct the majority of their media activities at their constituents.
This does not tell the entire story, however. Over half of the respondents stated that
they also seek to reach other legislators both in their own party as well as the
opposing party. Interest groups, as well as the public outside of their constituency,
are also prime targets of media activities. The traditional belief that legislators are
only concerned with reaching constituents with their media tactics appears to be false.
State legislators have a variety of audiences in mind for their media tactics. Studies
that focus solely on constituent media relations provide a rather shortsighted view of
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media strategies. Future studies should recognize this and continue to examine how
state legislators use media to communicate with a variety of audiences.
Most importantly for representation, it seems that legislators in professional
state legislatures are more likely to use the media to communicate with constituents
than are legislators in less professional legislatures. Since citizens gain the majority
of their information about state politics from the media (Delli Carpini, Keeter and
Kennemar 1994), legislators who are less apt to use media to communicate are likely
to represent citizens who know less about their policy positions, their actions and
their beliefs. In short, if legislators are less likely to use the media to communicate,
citizens are less likely to be knowledgeable about their legislator. Although this study
doesn't speak directly to this question, evidence seems to suggest that the process of
representation, which depends on informed citizens, works better in states with
professional legislatures where legislators have more active media strategies. Future
studies should more specifically examine the relationship between citizen information
about their representatives and professionalism.
Implications for the Policy Process
While this chapter speaks to representation, its conclusions speak most directly to the
role of the media in the policy process. Most importantly, we now know that state
legislators use the media in the policy process. While not as important as more
traditional modes of legislating (contacting other legislators, speaking on the floor,
etc.), the media is an actor in the policy process. This marks a significant
improvement in our knowledge about legislative behavior. Recent evidence suggests
that media is increasingly a tool used in congressional politics (Cook 1988; Cook
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1998; Kedrowski 1996). It appears that it also a tool used to legislate in the states.
We now better understand that using media is one of many tactics legislators use in
the policy process. This is certainly not the last word on this subject. Indeed, much
work needs to be done examining more specifically the nature and frequently of this
relationship. Nonetheless, the findings here provide a necessary baseline to continue.
This chapter has explored how state legislators use media relations to better
complete their job. While primarily descriptive, it provides answers to some
fundamental questions. Most importantly, this study provides empirical evidence that
state legislators, like their congressional counterparts, often attempt use the media.
Although their efforts might not always be successful, state legislators do attempt to
affect the news. Scholars of state legislatures would be well advised to consider
media relations as an important component of legislative behavior.
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CHAPTER IV:
MEDIA CONSUMPTION IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE

While the last chapter considered at length how legislators use media to disseminate
information, this chapter changes gears slightly and considers how legislators
consume media. Surprisingly, while we continue to make inroads in understanding
patterns of citizen media consumption, scholars have ignored, with very few
exceptions (Weiss 1974), how e1ites consume media. This is particularly
disconcerting considering the recent work of Susan Herbst ( 1998). In her
examination of the l1linois State legislature, Herbst found that state legislative staff
often consider media content and public opinion as the same thing. According to
Herbst," ... all [of the staffers interviewed] be1ieved that newspaper, television or
radio content was not simply a conduit for public opinion expression: In their view, it
is the very essence of public opinion and can support or destroy legislative initiatives"
(Herbst 1998:65). While Herbst (1998) shows that media consumption is a vitally
important part of the legislative process in Illinois, she does not discuss patterns of
consumption by legislators. This chapter picks up where Herbst left off, and
examines patterns of media consumption in three disparate states. While no one has
looked at this subject directly, there is nonetheless a wealth of literature on
information use and communication in legislatures that informs this study. Although
Chapter 2 discussed what this means for representation, more background is needed.
In order to provide context for where the media fit into broader questions of
information flow in legislatures, I first briefly review what we know about other
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sources of information in legislatures as well as the status of media as compared to
these other sources. Next, I discuss what little we know about patterns of elite media
consumption in general. After this, I discuss the questions and hypotheses that guide
this chapter. Finally, I discuss the findings.

Information and Communication in Legislatures
State legislative scholars have long studied how various sources of information cue
the behavior and choices of legislators (Bradley 1980; Sabatier and Whiteman 1985;
Wissel, O'Connor and King 1976). Unfortunately, while the literature frequently
examines the role of other legislators (Mooney 199 la), the party caucus (Uslaner and
Weber 1977), staff (Mooney 1991b), interest groups (Nownes 1999) and constituents
(Bowman and Maggiotto 1981 ), few scholars, particularly at the state level have
examined the role of the media as an information source.
Together, these studies suggest that there are a number of different factors that
can affect what a legislator knows about a particular issue. The role of organized
interests, political parties, constituents, staff members and the opinions and
predispositions of the legislator herself cannot be ignored. Neither, however, can the
media. In his analysis of information sources in the state legislature, Christopher
Mooney (199 lb) found that legislators consult media as a source for information.
Despite the fact that it is undoubtedly a major source of information, we know
remarkably little about patterns of legislator media consumption. As two recent
scholars surmised about the U.S. Congress, "Contemporary knowledge about
Senators and Representatives' use of the mass media relies on an extremely limited
number of studies that are both dated and limited in scope" (Bennett and Yanovitzky
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2000). Certainly, the same can be said of similar studies in the state legislature.
Although only one piece of the puzzle, gaining a better understanding how legislators
consume various media sources will give scholars a better picture of how legislators
acquire information, and by extension, make decisions.

What We Know About Media As An Information Source
Almost three decades ago, John Kingdon (1973) suggested that while not as
important as other sources, media can be important sources of information for voting
decisions, particularly on salient issues. Furthermore, Kingdon posits that although
not easy to measure, media have a strong indirect effect on the choices and priorities
of legislators. This indirect effect may occur more often by affecting the legislator's
agenda, rather than affecting decisions on issues that have already reached the
agenda. Simply stated, legislators are not immune from the agenda setting effects of
the media (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).
Despite early suggestions of an indirect effect of the media as an information
source, few scholars have tackled this important area of research. Carol Weiss (1974)
examined media consumption by a number of leaders in American society, including
U.S. Senators and Representatives. Weiss concludes that members of Congress
frequently read major newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington

Post. Slightly fewer reported reading the major newsmagazines. Bennett and
Yanovitzky (2000) found that members of Congress exhibit evidence of a selection
bias meaning that members' choices of media outlets are determined largely by
partisan leanings. Specifically, Democratic members are more likely to read
traditionally liberal newspapers (such as the Washington Post), while their
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Republican counterparts are more likely to consult conservative stalwarts like the

Washington Times.
While these studies provide a glimpse of the work that has been done
regarding media consumption in Congress, only one study has examined media
consumption in the state legislature. Daniel Riffe (1990) surveyed Alabama state
legislators regarding their media consumption and found that "legislators' views of
the news media's role may affect ratings of news media as information sources"
(1990:323). Legislators who believe the media function in an adversarial role are less
likely to be heavy consumers of news for policy information. Likewise, legislators
who perceive the media as an "agent of consensus" are more likely to believe that
acquiring policy information from media is useful.
Questions and Hypotheses
Using survey data described in Chapter 1, I seek to answer a number of questions
regarding media consumption in the state legislature. First, when legislators use
media as a source for policy information, what outlets do they use? Answering this
question will not only give scholars a better idea of how legislators gain information
for decision-making purposes, but can also provide legislators with a better
understanding of where to aim their media strategies. I hypothesize two relationships
stemming from this question. Since legislators are primarily concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1972) and must stay in touch with their district in order to remain
in office, I hypothesize:
H 1: Legislators consume district media more often than capital media.
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Also, considering that print media is generally credited with providing better
coverage of state politics (Gormley 1978), I hypothesize:
H 2: Legislators consume print media more often than televised media.
The second research question asks: What factors predict how often a legislator
will utilize the media as a source of information? Little theoretical literature suggests
which variables affect a legislator's propensity to consume media. To begin
exploring this dynamic, I include variables representing district characteristics (state
in which the legislator serves, district income), as well as institutional characteristics
(chamber, legislator's party), and legislator characteristics (age, gender, and a final
attitudinal variable measuring media entrepreneurship). While the other variables are
relatively self-explanatory, a few words about the final variable are in order. The
final variable is an attitudinal variable indicating where the legislator falls on the
scale of media entrepreneurship (Kedrowski 1996). While related, I should note that
this is a theoretically distinct concept from consumption. While entrepreneurship
measures how a legislator feels about using media as a means of disseminating
information, consumption measures how often a legislator reads newspapers and
magazines, watches television, listens to the radio and reads articles on the Internet.
It is quite conceivable that, for a variety of reasons, a legislator might use media
strategies to disseminate information, but not have the time or inclination to consume
media. Nonetheless, consistent with Kedrowski's (1996) findings about members of
Congress, I hypothesize:
HJ:

Legislators who score higher on a scale of media entrepreneurship will be

more avid consumers of media than legislators who score lower on the scale.
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Taken together, answers to these questions should provide a much better
understanding of how state legislators use media as a source for policy information.
The results are presented next.

Results
Each legislator was asked to indicate on a four-point scale their response to the
following question: "When you are seeking information regarding public policy, how
often do you consult each of the following sources?" The question was asked
regarding a number of media sources including: paper of record in the state capital,
alternative newspaper in the state capital, newspaper in the legislator's district,
specialized trade publications and newsletters, Wall Street Joumal, New York Times,
Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, weekly magazines (e.g. Time,
Newsweek), National Public Radio, CNN, local newscasts in state capital, local
newscasts in the legislator's district, local public access television, and the Internet.
The list was constructed to include district, capital and national media as well as print,
television and "new media." Although certainly not exhaustive, I believe this list
accurately represents the media outlets most likely to be consumed by state
legislators.
The data suggest that legislators are most likely to read the newspaper in their
home district. The local newscast in their district is of secondary importance. Next,
legislators are most likely to read the paper of record in the capital, followed by the
newscast in the capital. Specialized publications and magazines, the alternative
newspaper in the state capital, and the Internet are next. Finally, public access
television, National Public Radio, weekly magazines (Time, Newsweek, etc.), Wall
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Street Joumal, New York Times, Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor
are consulted the least often. The results are presented in Table 9.

In sum, it appears that legislators stay abreast of policy information first and
foremost by consuming media that comes from their district, regardless of the form.
Although legislators may consult capital and national media, they are secondary to
district media. In order to test this assertion further, I conducted a difference of
means tests comparing the frequency with which legislators consume the primary
district media (district newspaper and district newscast) and the primary capital media
(paper of record in state capital and capital newscasts). The difference is highly
significant (t= 8.205; p<.001), suggesting that legislators are significantly more
likely to consume district than capital media. This 4s consistent with the hypothesized
relationship. This also suggests that despite increasing professionalism, legislators
still find ways to stay in touch with their constituents. If, as Herbst ( 1998) suggests,
legislators use media content to understand public opinion, it appears that legislators
are most concerned with public opinion in the district.
Next, a quick glance at Table 9 suggests that print media are consulted more
frequently as sources of policy information than electronic media. To test this
assertion, I conducted a difference of means test to compare print and electronic
media. The first group consists of the frequency with which legislators consume the
primary newspaper outlets (paper of record in state capital and paper of newspaper in
home district). The second group measures the frequency with which legislators
consume the primary televised media (newscasts in state capital and newscasts in
home district). The difference between these two groups is highly significant
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(t=3.952, p<.001). It seems that the newspaper is still the leader for state legislative
news. This is consistent with H2• Print media are generally credited with providing
better and more complete coverage of state politics (Gormley 1978). Considering
this, it is not surprising that legislators prefer print media to televised media.
Furthermore, Herbst's respondents in the Illinois legislature refer almost exclusively
to print based media when discussing the uses of media content for understanding
public opinion.
Who Consumes Media?
The above data suggest that legislators use media to gather policy information and
that print media and district media are preferred. Next, I seek to find out what factors
predict whether a legislator will consult the media for policy information. I also seek
to find if this varies by type of media. To test these questions, I ran five OLS
regression models. The first tests the factors that predict total media consumption,
the second looks at print media consumption, the third examines television
consumption, the fourth examines consumption of National Public Radio and the fifth
examines consumption of Internet news. These models should provide a glimpse of
the patterns of media consumption on the whole, as well as demonstrate differences
between each major type of media. For each model, independent variables were
included for state (Georgia, Iowa-one dummy variable for each), average income in
the district (income), party of the legislator ( !=Democrat), chamber of the legislator

(!=upper house), gender of the legislator (l=male), age of the legislator (age), and
leadership status ( !=party or legislative leader). The final independent variable,

entrepreneurship, is a scale measuring a legislator's propensity to view the media as a
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useful means of communicating with a variety of audiences-what Kedrowski (1996)
refers to as media entrepreneurship. To construct this scale, each legislator was asked
to indicate (on a five point scale) how strongly he or she agreed with four statements
regarding media as a tool for legislating. The scores for each question were added
together to produce a score of entrepreneurship. This score ranges from four to
twenty. The surveys items used to create the scale are listed below.
1. Members of the state legislature often solicit media exposure (i.e. interviews,

talk show appearances, op-eds, press releases, etc.) as a way to stimulate
discussion about policy proposals.
2. Soliciting media exposure is a particularly effective way to put an issue on the
legislative agenda.
3. Media exposure is an effective way to convince other legislators in both
chambers to support policy proposals.
4. Media exposure is an effective way to stimulate discussion on policy
alternatives and issues among executive branch officials.
The questions used to create this scale are identical to those used by Kedrowski
(1996) to measure a member of Congress' propensity to utilize the media as an output
for information. Kedrowski found the scale to be valid (1996: 67). Results from all
five models are displayed in Table 10.

Total Media Consumption
As stated previously, each legislator was asked how often she consumes
fifteen different media sources. Each legislator's response to each of these questions
was averaged together, creating a single scale of total media consumption where
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scores ranged from one to four. This scale was used as dependent variable in the total
media consumption model. While the dependent variable is not continuous, the
distribution of the residuals is normal, and the model seems appropriate for OLS
regression. The model produces a number of substantively important findings. First,
entrepreneurship is significant (p<.05). This suggests that a legislator's propensity to
utilize the media to communicate with a variety of audiences is significantly related
to his/her propensity to use media to gather information. In other words, legislators
seem to have an overall impression of the usefulness of the media, regardless of
whether the media is being used as a way to gather information or a way to
disseminate information.
Democrat is also significant (p<.01) suggesting that Democratic state
legislators are more likely than Republicans to use the media as a source for policy
information. Although there are a number of possible explanations for this
relationship, the most likely has direct implications for the role theory of media
consumption (Riffe 1990). A number of scholars have found that statehouse
journalists are overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic (Rozell 1994: Beyle, Ostdiek
and Lynch 1996). It is likely then that Republican legislators' daily interactions with
the largely Democratic statehouse press corps leads them to view the press as
adversaries. Although Beyle, Ostdiek and Lynch (1996) find that the content of the
state press coverage is not biased towards Democrats, Republican legislators may feel
that the predominately liberal capital press corps they interact with on a daily basis
are working against rather than with them. Accordingly, they consume less media.
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Male is weakly and negatively related (p<. l), suggesting that female state

legislators are more likely to use media as a source for policy information. One
possible explanation for this relationship stems from work on casework and
constituency service. Richardson and Freeman ( 1995) found that female state
legislators put more time into casework than their male counterparts. Since we know
that district media are preferred, it is entirely plausible that the information seeking
behavior of female legislators is part of a larger concern for constituency service.
Future studies should continue to probe this dynamic.
Finally, Georgia and /o1,va are negatively related (p<.05). This suggests that
legislators in Georgia and Iowa are less likely to utilize media as a source for policy
information than their counterparts in California. It is likely that due to larger staff
resources afforded California state legislators, California legislators have more time
to consume media than legislators in less professional states where the legislator
herself must take greater responsibility for the daily goings on in the legislative
office.
While the previous model demonstrates broad trends in media consumption;
we still do not know if patterns of media consumption in general hold for each type of
media. In other words, do certain types of legislators consume one type of media at
the expense of others? To answer this question, the next four models examine major
outlets for state politics and government news.
Print Media Consumption

The first model tests the factors that predict a legislator's propensity to
consume print media. The dependent variable is the average of 10 questions asking
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how frequently a legislator consumes a number of different media (Wall Street
Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Weekly
magazines, e.g. Time, Newsweek). The scale ranges from one to four. The residuals
are normally distributed and although not continuous, the dependent variable seems
appropriate for OLS.
There are some differences between this model and the total consumption
model discussed previously. Three of the five significant variables in the total
consumption model are not significant here. Democrat (p<.05) is once again
significant and entrepreneurship (p<. l) is weakly related. Male, Georgia and Iowa,
which were all negatively significant in the last model, are not significant in the print
consumption model. These changes suggest that legislators distinguish between
different types of media-- consuming one medium often at the expense of another.
The data suggest that each medium attracts a different population of legislators.
Television Consumption
The next model tests the factors that predict a legislator's propensity to
consume televised media. The dependent variable is the average of a respondent's
answer to questions regarding the frequency with which he/she consumes the
following media: CNN, local newscasts in the state capital, local newscasts in your
district and local public access television. Responses range from one to four. Once
again, the distribution of the residuals is normal and the model appears appropriate
for OLS.
Entrepreneurship (p<.01 ), District Income (p<.01, negatively); Democrat
(p<.05) are all significant. Male (p<.l) is negatively and weakly related. Once again,
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there are significant changes from the previous models, suggesting that there is
variation in patterns of consumption. Entrepreneurship is highly significant. It
appears that legislators who feel that the media is a more effective tool to disseminate
information are most likely to consume televised media. District income is also
significant (negatively) for the first time. While the income of the district has no
impact on total media consumption and print media consumption, it is highly
significant in a negative direction for televised media consumption. Legislators from
poorer districts are more likely to consume televised media than legislators from
wealthier districts. If legislators use media content as a proxy for public opinion
(Herbst 1998), it appears that legislators from poorer districts receive a different
picture of public opinion than legislators from wealthier districts. Since newspapers
have more space devoted to news than ielevised media, legislators from poorer
districts may receive a more incomplete picture of public opinion than legislators who
utilize print media more frequently. Their opinion of opinion may be skewed towards
stories that are covered on television, but may be avoided in the newspaper. Finally,
females are more likely to consume televised media than males. Since this variable
was significant for the overall model, but not significant for print consumption, it
appears that it is the consumption of televised media that is driving the significant in
the total consumption model. Again, it appears that women find something more
appealing than men in the news coverage on television. Reasons for this relationship
are somewhat puzzling. Future studies should address this dynamic in more detail.
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National Public Radio Consumption
The next model uses consumption of National Public Radio (NPR) as the
dependent variable. Responses ran from one to four. Examination of the residuals
suggests that the model is appropriate for OLS. NPR is a slightly different medium
than the others examined thus far. First, it is explicitly national in its focus. Second,
it has long been known as a source of good, "hard" news- something in scarce supply
on local television and many of the other outlets analyzed thus far. Also, NPR is the
only radio outlet discussed in this paper. There is typically a picture of the NPR
audience as more affluent and homogeneous than the audience of other mediums.
Once again, Democrat is highly significant (p<.01), suggesting that
Democratic state legislators are much more likely to utilize National Public Radio to
gain policy information than their Republican counterparts. This is not surprising.

NPR has long been perceived as a liberal institution (Kedrowski 1996) and fitting
with role theory (Riffe 1990) would most likely be perceived as adversarial by
Republican legislators. Male is also negatively related (p<.01 ). It appears that female
legislators are more likely to consume both NPR and television than their male
counterparts. Entrepreneurship is not, however, significant. It appears that attitude
towards using the media in general as a tool for legislating and re-election does not
make a legislator more likely to listen to National Public Radio to gather policy
information. Legislators seem to make a key distinction between media and general
and NPR in particular. For many of the reasons cited earlier, NPR is a different type
of media and should be treated as such. Georgia is also significant in this model
(p<.05) suggesting that Georgia state legislators are more likely to consume national
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public radio than legislators in Iowa and California. Finally, income is weakly related
(p<.l). Certainly, NPR is a media outlet consumed predominately by the wealthy.
Thus is no surprise that legislators from wealthier districts would see NPR as a more
worthwhile source of information than their counterparts from other districts.
Together, these results suggest that legislators view NPR as fundamentally different
than other types of media.

Intenzet Consumption
The Internet is a growing source of news and information for citizens and
legislators alike (Davis 1999; Davis and Owen 1998). Accordingly, the final model
tests variables that predict the frequency with which legislators use the Internet for
policy information. The dependent variable ranges from one to four. Once again,
tests suggest that the model is appropriate for OLS.
Here, Iowa (p<.01) and Georgia (p<.l) are negatively related to the dependent
variable, suggesting that legislators from California are more likely to use the Internet
as a source of policy information than legislators from other states. While there could
be a number of reasons to explain this relationship, the most likely explanation is that
the higher levels of professionalism in California afford California legislators better
resources, more time as well as better technological support and training for accessing
the Internet. Surprisingly, the data also suggest that younger legislators and male
legislators are no more likely to use the Internet as a source for policy information
than other legislators. Despite the common perception that Internet users are
primarily young and male (Davis 1999; Pitkow 1998), the data do not support this
conclusion for state legislators. It appears that institutional support is more important
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than demographic characteristics in predicting how often a legislator will use the
Internet for policy information. Certainly, future studies should continue to examine
this dynamic in more detail as the Internet becomes a more important part of the
legislative process.

Conclusions and Implications For Representation
This chapter has produced a number of key findings. First, I find that legislators
prefer district media to either capital or national media when seeking policy
information. Certainly, this has important implications for legislative representation.
While legislatures may be becoming increasingly professional (King 2000) and
legislators may spend more time in the state capital, it appears that legislators have
continued to be concerned about constituency opinion. Through consumption of
district media, legislators continue to stay abreast of district public opinion (Herbst
1998). While this may be viewed as positive, there is certainly a negative side. If a
legislator's view of the happenings in their district is largely influenced by media in
their home district, this places a substantial burden on media outlets and journalists.
Journalists craft their story with a variety of purposes in mind, foremost among these
attracting the attention of the average citizen and providing them with information
they need. It is unlikely that journalists consider the sorts of specialized information
legislators need to make informed decisions. Indeed, there seems to be a mismatch is
the motivations of the information provider (the journalist) and the information
consumer (the legislator). If legislators draw inferences about public opinion from
district media content, scholars of public opinion and state politics should spend more
time examining the nature and content of this coverage as well as the behavior of
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journalists in the states. Future studies should also see if the legislator's choice of
media varies as the political ambitions of the legislator shift. In other words, as
legislators set their sights on higher office, do they become more concerned with
media content in other parts of the state? The capital? Does their attitude towards
national media change? Although I would suspect the answer to these questions are
in the affirmative, the data presented here does not speak to the issue. Future studies
should.
I also find that print media are generally preferred to televised media. The
Internet, while an important source of information is still not consumed as often as
more traditional media. Legislators who seek media coverage to reach their
colleagues would be well advised to expend their media efforts writing editorials and
courting print journalists. Efforts spent courting televised media appear to be much
less successful in reaching other legislators.
The data also suggest that Democratic state legislators are generally more
likely to use the media to gather information than Republican legislators. This
appears to support the role theory of media relations (Riffe 1990). Due to contact
with overwhelmingly Democratic statehouse reporters, Republican lawmakers are
likely to view the press as an adversary. Thus, they consume media less frequently
than Democratic legislators who may view the media as an ally. The age of the
legislator, whether the legislator is a party or legislative leader and whether the
legislator resides in the upper or lower house appears to have no effect on the type of
media the legislator consumes.
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I have also shown that National Public Radio and the Internet are
fundamentally different than other media. Patterns of usage found for print and
televised media are not found in these more specialized outlets. Most important, it
appears that demographic characteristics have little impact on a legislator's
propensity to use the Internet for gathering information. The only significant
variables appear to be based on institutional, rather than district or legislator
characteristics. In other words, it appears that if state legislators are given the means
for Internet access, many of the well-documented variables in the digital divide (age,
gender) cease to be important determinants as to whether legislators will utilize the
media for information seeking behavior. Future studies should continue to examine
these non-traditional media outlets, probing to see how they will affect the legislative
process in the 21 s1 century.
While I do not suggest that the media are the only source of information in
state legislatures, evidence shows that the media do play a role. Gaining a better
understanding of this role gives us a more complete picture of the information
gathering behavior and decision-making environment of state legislators.
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CHAPI'ER V:
ETABLISHING A PLACE FOR E-MAIL AND THE INTERNET:
COMPUTERIZED MEDIA AND THE STATE LEGISLATURE

Unfortunately, media studies seem to be divided into those that consider the Internet
and e-mail exclusively (Adler, Gent and Overmeyer 1998; Davis 1999; Davis and
Owen 1998; Messmer, Carreiro and Metivier-Carreiro 2000; Richardson, Daugherty
and Freeman 2001) and those that ignore computerized media and focus instead on
traditional media (Cook 1998; Kedrowski 1996). In order to combat this problem, I
consider both traditional media and non-traditional media. While previous chapters
have focused on traditional print and televised media, this chapter focuses specifically
on computerized media. This should provide a better understanding of the
relationship between state legislators and all types of media.
The literature on the Internet and e-mail in legislatures is small. Few scholars
have established how, when, or why state legislators use the Internet and/or e-mail.
Slightly more literature examines how members of Congress use the Internet and email. As a result, although this chapter concentrates specifically on the use of
Internet and e-mail in the state legislature, the following section will review what we
know about e-mail and the Internet in Congress as well as e-mail and the Internet in
the state legislature.

E-Mail and the Internet in Congress
Members of Congress began using the Internet to complete their jobs in 1993
(Browning 1994, cited in Adler, Gent and Overmeyer 1998). Since then, virtually
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every member has secured an e-mail account. Also, due to Newt Gingrich's Cyber
Congress project, hundreds of legislators have created web pages (Adler, Gent and
Overmeyer 1998). In studying why certain member use the web for constituent
contact while other shirk such web page use, Adler, Gent and Overmeyer ( 1998) find
that "Republicans, younger legislators, and representatives of more affluent
populations are more likely to reach out to constituents through homepages" (592).
Research has also suggested that Congressional web pages do not tend to include
controversial information, but rather contain mostly neutral information (Messmer et.
al 2000). Messmer et. al (2000) also find that members' Internet pages are not
catered to district messages but instead are generally aimed at national audiences and
contain broad messages.
E-Mail and the Internet in State Legislatures
While state legislators have been somewhat slower to adopt and use the Internet and
e-mail than their congressional counterparts, they have nonetheless closed this gap in
recent years (Davis 1999). In her study of the New York assembly, Antoinette Pole
(2000) found that while there is some resistance from older legislators, many state
legislators are now using the World Wide Web to gain information and to disseminate
it. In sum, Pole's study suggests that at least in one legislature, e-mail and the
Internet are beginning to change the way state legislators complete their jobs.
In their study of the Tennessee legislature, Richardson, Daugherty and
Freeman (2001) investigate how state legislators use e-mail to communicate with
their constituents. They find that e-mail is an increasingly important part of
constituency service and constituency contact. Moreover, they find that neither
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district characteristics nor legislator characteristics are significant factors in
predicting the number of constituency requests a legislator receives over e-mail. The
only significant factors predicting this relationship are the legislator's attitude towards
constituency service in general and the use of other contact methods such as office
hours (Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman 2001 ). In short, they find no "digital
divide" in what types of citizens make e-mail requests. The Richardson, Daugherty
and Freeman (2001) study is commendable as is it the only extant work that takes a
quantitative look at how state legislators use e-mail. While their study is a step
forward, more research is necessary for two reasons. First, while Richardson,
Daugherty and Freeman (2001) give us a good picture of the patterns of e-mai I use in
the Tennessee legislator, we do not know if their findings are generalizeable to other
legislatures. Here, I look at how e-mail has affected legislators in three disparate
states. Second, the Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman (2001) study is limited to the
use of e-mail for constituency contact and ignores other possible uses for e-mail.
A recent survey found that 72% of Americans think that the growth of Internet
technology and e-mail will improve the process of representation in the United States
(Greenberg 2001). Other observers claim that the advent of new technology will have
little impact on the democratic process in the United States (Davis 1999). The bottom
line is that we have little hard evidence either way. This chapter is an early attempt to
shed light on the use of e-mail and the Internet in the state legislature.

Plan of This Chapter
In this chapter, I add to the nascent literature on information technologies in state
legislatures, concentrating on a few central questions. First, how pervasive is the use
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of e-mail and the Internet in state legislatures? While the Richardson, Daugherty and
Freeman (2001) study provides a nice baseline of information; it examines only one
state and only in a limited context (e-mail for constituency contact). Next, I ask, what
factors predict whether a legislator will use e-mail and the Internet? Do legislators
use e-mail and Internet as a low-cost means of reaching audiences when they have
few resources? Who do legislators intend to reach with their use of e-mail and the
Internet? It is assumed that they aim to reach constituents, but do legislators aim to
reach other members of the public as well? Other legislators? Other elites? Finally,
by comparing the results garnered here to those found in Congress, how do state
legislators and members of Congress differ in their use of information technology?
After discussing the data source, I will discuss the results into two sections, one
addressing how legislators use electronic mail and the other addressing legislator use
of web pages. At the end, I will make some broad conclusions about what the data
suggest about these two technologies taken in conjunction.

The Data
To answer these questions, I utilize data gathered from two sources. The first is a
survey of state legislators in Iowa, Georgia and California. The second is a brief
analysis of legislator web sites. Details on the survey are provided in Chapter 1. The
second data source, however, needs a little more explanation.
To compliment the survey, I conducted a brief analysis of web sites of the
universe of state legislators in all fifty states. First, I checked to see if the legislator
had a web page associated with their job as legislator. If the legislator did have a
page, I next looked to see if the page was created by the legislator, the legislature, or
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the caucus. Generally, this was quite easy to determine. Most pages have a note at
the bottom indicating who is responsible for creating and maintaining the page.
When the responsible party was not identified at the bottom of the page, I e-mailed an
official at the legislature to find out who was responsible. This method provides a
crude, but useful way to get a feel for the content of state legislative web pages, and
identify who controls the content of legislative web pages.
Results: Electronic Mail

Each legislator was asked a number of questions regarding his/her use of e-mail.
First, each legislator was asked, "Do you have an e-mail account?" Of 193
legislators who returned surveys, 177 responded that they do have an e-mail account
(91. 7% ). It appears that almost all state legislators today have an e-mai I account
associated with their job as legislator. The question then arises, who are legislators
using e-mail to communicate with?
Previous studies have established that legislators aim to reach constituents and
use e-mail as a new means of constituency service (Richardson, Daugherty and
Freeman 2001). Indeed, most articles speculating about the role of e-mail in state
legislatures concentrate on constituency contact (Boulard 2000; Bouquard and
Greenberg 1996; Greenberg 2001; Jones 1999). The question remains, is this the
only use for e-mail, or do legislators utilize e-mail to reach other groups as well? To
answer this question, each legislator who indicated that they have e-mail was asked,
"Who do you use e-mail to communicate with? Check all that apply." Response
categories were as follows: constituents, other legislators, government agencies,
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governor's office, party leaders, personal use, other. Figure 4 presents the results
from this question.
The data suggest that legislators use e-mail to communicate with groups other
than their constituents. While 154 (91.7% of those with e-mail) legislators indicate
that they use e-mail to communicate with constituents, over three quarters of these
legislators also indicate that they use e-mail to communicate with other legislators.
Over half of the legislators who responded indicate that they use their e-mail to
communicate with government agencies. Just under one half indicate they use e-mail
to communicate with party leaders and over one third use e-mail to communicate with
the Governor's office. Taken together, these data suggest that e-mail is becoming an
important new means of communication, not only for constituent contact, but for
reaching political elites as well. Particularly in the state legislature, where legislators
spend considerable time outside the state capital, evidence suggests that e-mail can
provide a vital link for legislators to build coalitions and communicate about policy
and legislative issues. Scholars examining this dynamic in the future should move
past the notion of e-mail as simply a new means of constituency contact. Evidence
suggests that e-mail is used to reach a variety of audiences. Future studies should
recognize this.
While the vast majority of legislators may have e-mail access, that does not
mean they utilize the technology. To probe deeper into this dynamic, I asked each
legislator, "In an average week, how often do you check your e-mail?" While this is
not a perfect measure of e-mail use, it does provide a rough measure of how much
time legislators devote to communicating via e-mail. Certainly, a legislator who
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checks her e-mail more than once a day places a higher priority on e-mail
communication than a legislator who checks her e-mail once a week. Responses were
coded as follows:
5= More than once a day
4= Once a day
3= Every other day
2= Once a week
l=Less than once a week
Responses to the previous question were used as a dependent variable in OLS
regression. A number of independent variables were tested, including district
characteristics, institutional characteristics and legislator characteristics. The
variables employed are as follows: average district income (district income), urban or
rural composition of the district (}=urban), state (Georgia, Califomia), chamber

(!=upper house), party (l= Democrat), age, leader (!=party or legislative leader) and
gender (l=male). A final attitudinal variable was included (Internet attitude). This is
a question asking legislators, "When you are seeking information regarding public
policy, how often do you consult the Internet?" Answers were on a five-point scale
ranging from never to frequently. Results from the model are displayed in Table 11.
It appears that district characteristics have little effect on a legislator's
propensity to frequently check e-mail. Neither urban nor district income are
significant. Both of these findings are quite surprising. It is often suggested that the
rich are more likely to use e-mail than the poor (Hindman 2000; Pitkow 1998).
Likewise, Hindman (2000) found evidence of a rural-urban digital divide. I had thus
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expected that legislators from wealthier districts would receive more e-mail and thus
would check their e-mail more often than their counterparts representing poorer
districts. The data did not bear out this hypothesis. While counter to broader trends
in society, these findings support Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman's findings
(2001). They found that district income and the urban composition of the district had
no impact on the number of casework requests received over e-mail by Tennessee
legislators.
The data suggest that the state in which a legislator serves is significant.

Georgia legislators are less likely to check their e-mail frequently than legislators
from Iowa and California (p<.05). Surprisingly, California is not significant. I had
expected that legislators from California would use e-mail more often than legislators
from other states due to California's reputation as the center of the technological
revolution. Most surprising, however, is not that the relationship is not significant,
but that the direction of the relationship is negative. Although not significant, this
suggests that California legislators not only do not check their e-mail more than
legislators from other states, but may in fact check their e-mail less often. While this
is initially counterintuitive, California is a more professional legislature. One
possible explanation is that staff members rather than the legislator herself use e-mail
in the legislative office. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that oftentimes staff
members do answer e-mail for the legislator (Boulard 2000). California legislators
also might receive so many e-mail requests, that they do not check e-mail themselves,
or may limit the number of times they check e-mail.
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Neither age, Democrat nor leader is significant in the model. Despite
findings in other populations that those who use e-mail frequently are younger than
their counterparts who do not use electronic mail (Hindman 2000), the data suggest
that legislators do not follow this trend. The findings regarding party support those of
Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman (200 l) who found that neither age, nor party
were significant predictors of whether Tennessee legislators use e-mail for
constituency service. Again, although Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman (2001)
examine only constituency service, their study provides the only baseline from which
to make comparisons.

Male is significant in this model (p<.01 ), suggesting that male state legislators
check their e-mail more often than female legislators. This is consistent with broader
trends in Internet usage. Most studies have found that males are more likely to have
web pages, to check e-mail and to spend time on-line than females (Davis and Owen
1998; Hindman 2000; Pitkow 1998). While consistent with broader trends in society,
this finding is contrary to the conclusion of Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman
(2001) who found that Tennessee female state legislators receive more e-mail
requests for casework than male state legislators. My findings suggest that although
Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman (2001) may be correct that female state
legislators receive more constituent requests via e-mail than males, females do not
appear to use e-mail as often for other purposes. Indeed, it seems that if females
receive more constituency requests via e-mail, it is because of their general outlook
towards constituency service (Richardson and Freeman 1995), not because of their
propensity to use e-mail.
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Internet attitude is significant (p<.01 ). It appears that legislators who

frequently use the Internet to gain policy information, are more likely to check their
e-mail frequently. This suggests that legislators have an attitude towards the use of
information technologies in general that may not vary depending upon the type of
technology. Legislators who spend time on the Internet gathering policy information
are more likely to utilize other information technologies.
In sum, the data show that legislators from Georgia are less likely to use email frequently. Conversely, male legislators and legislators who see the Internet as a
positive source for obtaining policy information are more likely to utilize e-mail
frequently. While by no means the final word on the subject, these findings provide
an early assessment of how e-mail is used in the state legislature.
Results: Web Pages

Many legislators view web pages as a low-cost, high-yield way to reach a number of
audiences. Adler, Gent and Overmeyer (1998) found that increasingly, members of
Congress are using web pages in the completion of their jobs. This section attempts
to see if this conclusion applies to state legislators as well.
A quick look at each state legislature's web page shows that almost all state
legislators have web pages associated with their jobs as legislator. Furthermore,
every legislator in Iowa and Georgia and all but 4 legislators in California have a web
page associated with their job. At a minimum, each page lists contact information,
the committees on which the legislator serves and basic biographical information. At
a maximum, each legislator's page contained the above information, information on
their district, the legislator's past votes, family information as well as information
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about the legislature in general. While this would seem to suggest that the use of
home pages for communication has penetrated the state legislature, when asked, "Do
you have a web page associated with your job as legislator?" slightly less than half
(91/185) of the state legislators in my survey responded in the affirmative. What
explains this inconsistency?
It appears that the inconsistency lies with how web pages are defined. Upon
further examination, I found that while all but four legislators in the surveyed states
have web pages, these pages are not controlled by the individual legislator, or by
members of their staff, but rather by the either the legislature itself (in the case of
Georgia and Iowa) or by the party caucus (in the case of California). It seems that
while they are often referred to on the legislature's page as legislator "home pages,"
many legislators do not perceive them as such. Further examination of other states'
web pages demonstrates that these states are not anomalies. Examination of web
pages in all 50 state legislatures shows that the vast majority of legislator's individual
pages are created not by the legislator, or legislative staff, but rather by a third party.
Legislators in 44 states have their web pages created and maintained by the
legislature itself, and four are maintained by each party caucus (California,
Connecticut, Michigan and Indiana). In Indiana, the caucus controls web pages for
the lower house, while the legislature controls web pages in the upper house. Finally,
the Idaho state legislature has no individual web pages for members except those
created by the legislator herself. Only one member of Idaho's upper house and four
members of the lower house have created their own pages. In sum, the vast majority
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of web pages associated with state legislators are actually created by either the
legislature or the party caucus.
So, how much control do legislators themselves have over the content and
appearance of their page? The short answer is: not much. Although there is
obviously tremendous variation from state to state, it appears that generally the third
party vendor, whether it be the caucus or legislative support staff determines the
appearance and features of the page. Officials from the legislatures indicated that
generally, the content is taken from election pamphlets and includes little more than
basic demographic and contact information. Although some states do include recent
votes, officials from the stage legislatures indicated that this information is taken
directly from the voting record. Legislators are generally not given any chance to
explain votes or contribute to this information at all. As one legislator commented,
"Legislative computer (non) support Bureau geeks do not allow us to 'tamper' with
their insipid handiwork." When contacted via e-mail, legislative staff concurred.
"The legislators have no control over the web site. The House and Senate Clerk's
offices control all content," said the webmaster for one western state. Nor are
legislators convinced of their utility. One legislator noted, "Our individual legislative
web pages are strictly informational, non-interactive, and boring. Of almost no
value."
Of course, individual legislators are free to create their own web pages
through an independent company (AOL, Mindspring, etc.). My research indicates
that although this does happen, it is certainly not pervasive. Less than 5% of all
legislators have a personal web page in addition to the page created for them by the
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legislature or caucus. When a legislator does opt to create his/her own home page in
addition to the page created for them by the legislature or caucus, it tends to include
far more information than the pages created by the legislature or the caucus.

Limitations, Conclusions and Implications
Using a survey of state legislators in California, Georgia and Iowa, and a brief content
analysis of web pages in all fifty states, I have explored how state legislators use email and the Internet. The data produce a number of findings. First, the data suggest
that virtually all legislators have access to e-mail. While legislators may have varying
attitudes towards the use of e-mail, evidence suggests that virtually all have the ability
to access e-mail if they wish. Second, while legislators use e-mail most often to
communicate with constituents, e-mail is also used to communicate with other actors
including other legislators, government organizations, etc. These alternate uses foremail have been ignored in the literature. While the use of e-mail for constituency
contact is certainly important, more research needs to be conducted regarding how email is changing the way legislators communicate with other policy actors. Next,
broad trend of a younger, urban cohort using e-mail is not found amongst legislators.
While male legislators are more likely to check their e-mail frequently, other
components of the "digital divide" are not found amongst legislators.
Finally, this study concludes that web pages have a much different presence in
the state legislature than they do in Congress. While web pages have become a new
means of establishing a home style for members of Congress (Adler, Gent and
Overmeyer 1998), state legislators have not made use of this valuable and costefficient resource. Indeed, most legislators have little control over the content and no
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control over the style of their web pages. The vast majority of legislators' web pages
are not created by the legislators, but rather by support staff working for the
legislature. Unfortunately, the result is that a potentially valuable resource of
reaching a variety of interested publics is reduced to little more than a computer
screen of contact information and demographics.
These findings have direct implications for our broader understanding of the
changing nature of representation in the state legislature. Alan Rosenthal ( 1998) has
suggested that as legislators have increased their use of media tactics, polling and
constituency contact, we have a seen a "decline in representative democracy." This
has resulted in less deliberation, less consensus building, enfeebled leadership, and a
host of other unintended consequences. Although Rosenthal does not expressly
discuss e-mail and the Internet in his account of legislative life in the states, it could
be a welcome addition to his work. Although e-mail is used for more than just
constituency contact, it is primarily a means of reaching constituents. This is one
more sign that legislators are engaging in less deliberation and more activity to
appease their constituents. As Rosenthal suggests, this runs contrary to the intention
of the founders.
Government is no longer conducted with the consent of the governed, according to the
original federalist plan. It is conducted with significant participation by the governed, and by
those who claim to speak for the public's interest, according to a more populist plan. The
voices of the elected representatives are being drowned out by pronouncements made on
behalf the public. The legislature and the legislative process are in the throws of greater
democratization. Representative democracy, as the states had experienced it for several
centuries is in decline" (Rosenthal 1998: 4-5).
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This is the first study to use a multi-state survey to examine the use of e-mail
in the state legislature. Furthermore, it is the only study to examine the use of both email and web pages in the state legislature. Certainly more work needs to be done in
this area. Scholars of state legislatures need to recognize information technology as a
new means of legislator communication. This communication, however, has
implications beyond constituency contact. The advent of information technology is
rather the beginning of a potentially different way of legislating and campaigning.
This is a potentially fruitful and growing area of research. State legislative scholars
would be well advised to become aware of this growing trend.
Scholars should begin to consider computerized media and traditional media
together. While the characteristics of the users may vary, they are both influential
media. Furthermore, state legislators use both media to disseminate information as
well as to gather information.
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CHAPTER VI:
CONCLUSIONS, LIMIT ATIO NS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH

At the outset of this dissertation, I suggested that we know little about the relationship
between state legislators and media. For instance, no one has even established that
state legislators use media at all. As a result, I sought to answer a number of basic,
descriptive questions regarding the press/government connection in the state
legislature. Although there is no specific theory testing, establishing a baseline of
information will give scholars information from which to proceed. Hopefully,
scholars will begin to recognize the states as prime laboratories for developing a
theory of media and politics. Below, I review and discuss the major findings of this
research. Next, I discuss the implications that the findings have for our understanding
of legislative behavior and representation. Third, I discuss the limitations of the
study. Finally, I conclude with a number of directions for future research.
Major Findings

The following section serves two purposes. First, it reviews the major findings
gleaned from chapters 3, 4 and 5. More importantly, however, it places these findings
in the context of the dissertation as a whole.
State Legislators Use Media Tactics
Prior to this study, no one had demonstrated empirically that media play any
role in state legislative politics. Despite numerous assumptions, there was no hard
evidence that a press/government connection existed in the states. My findings
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suggest that media are important political actors in state legislative politics. State
legislators often use media tactics to achieve a variety of goals. Furthermore, the
media are not only used in the context of elections. Affecting media coverage is a
goal of legislators before, during and after elections. Future studies examining the
behavior of state legislators should recognize this. Likewise, now that we know state
legislators use media tactics, future studies in political communication should
concentrate on the state legislature as an area ripe for testing broader theories of
media and politics.
Traditional Means of Legislating Still Reign Supreme
While I find that state legislators use media for a variety of purposes, media
tactics remain secondary to more traditional means of legislating. Evidence suggests
that the use of media strategies augments rather than replaces a legislator's "bag of
legislative tricks." Certainly, this is the case in most political bodies. Recent studies
that have examined the press activities of Congress and the Presidency almost
uniformly agree that media tactics, while important, are still less important than
personal contact with political elites, traditional campaigning and a variety of other
traditional means of achieving policy goals (Kedrowski 1996). Among media tactics,
press releases appear to be the most popular. All of this suggests that while scholars
should begin to look at the media when they examine state legislative politics, the
importance of the media can easily be overstated. Using the media is one of many
ways to reach legislative goals-and not necessarily the most important. As one
respondent commented, "No matter how many times a legislator argues his case in
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the papers or on the airwaves, he'll end up losing the floor vote if he hasn't made
direct contacts with his colleagues and his constituents."

legislators Want to Reach Many Audiences-Not Just Constituents
There has been tremendous disagreement among congressional and media
scholars about who members of Congress wish to reach with media tactics. In recent
years, evidence has seemed to suggest that legislators seek to reach a variety of
audiences-not just constituents (Kedrowski 1996). My findings support this view. I
find that although state legislators seek to reach constituents first and foremost, they
also seek to reach other legislators, interest groups and the public outside of their
constituency. Future studies should recognize that the media are more than a new
means of reaching constituents. Media tactics are a potentially fruitful and growing
means of reaching a variety of audiences to realize a variety of goals.

Resources Matter
Among the most important conclusions of this dissertation, I find that
resources matter in determining why some legislators actively seek media coverage,
while others shirk media attention. Specifically, I find that controlling for other
factors, legislators from more professional state legislatures are more likely to use
media than legislators from other states. State professionalism is not, however, a
factor in predicting how effective legislators perceive media tactics to be. In other
words, most legislators feel similarly about the effectiveness of media tactics, but
vary in their tendency to use media tactics. This suggests that resources, rather than
perceived effectiveness, are the most important factors determining the extent to
which legislators will use media tactics. This runs contrary to Timothy Cook's
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(1998) suggestion that the intensity of a legislator's attempts to gain media coverage
increase as the gap between resources and expectations increases. Certainly, this
conclusion has implications for our broader understanding of both media and politics
the effects of professionalism. These are discussed at length later in this chapter.

The Garbage Can Continues to Explain Policy Fomwtion in the States
Congressional scholars have found that members of Congress tend to use
media most often in the agenda setting state of the policy process (Kedrowski 1996).
My findings suggest that this is not true in the state legislature. State legislators are
no more likely to use media to set the agenda than they are in other stages of the
policy process. Instead, the data support a garbage can model of the policy process.
In short, this suggests that the policy process is not a linear process. It is an
ambiguous process without distinguishable steps or "stages." In a garbage can model,
legislators do not use the media to varying degrees in different stages because they do
not see a distinction between the stages. The use of media tactics in the policy
process is a much less predictable, planned process and is instead uneven and
opportunistic.

District Media are More Important Than Other Media
I address not only issues of how state legislators use media to communicate
with others, but also, how they consume media. Here, I find that legislators consume
district media more often than capital media. Since legislators often use media as a
means of knowing public opinion (Herbst 1998), it is not surprising that they are most
concerned with knowing the opinion of their constituents. Furthermore, it
demonstrates that although legislators may spend more time in the state capital than
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they used to, they still stay attuned to the opinion of their constituents. Although this
may be viewed positively, there is certainly a downside. This places a substantial
burden on media outlets and journalists. Since journalists must remain responsive to
market forces rather than Democratic ideals, this can lead to a mismatch of goals,
which may have serious political consequences. These are discussed later.
Print Media are More Important Than Other Media
Just as state legislators prefer capital media to district media, they prefer print
to televised media. The Internet, while an important source of information is still not
consumed as often as more traditional media. Legislators who seek media coverage
to reach their colleagues would be well advised to expend their media efforts writing
editorials and courting print journalists. Efforts spent courting televised media appear
to be much less successful in reaching other legislators.
Democrats Consume More Media
I also find that Democratic state legislators are generally more likely to use
the media to gather information than Republican legislators. This supports the role
theory of media relations (Riffe 1990). Probably due to contact with overwhelmingly
Democratic statehouse reporters, Republican lawmakers are likely to view the press
as an adversary. Thus, they consume media less frequently than Democratic
legislators who may view the media as an ally. The age of the legislator, whether the
legislator is a party of legislative leader and whether the legislator resides in the upper
or lower house of the legislature appears to have no effect on the type of media the
legislator consumes.
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E-Mail is Pervasive in the State Legislature
Unfortunately, most studies of media and politics study either exclusively
traditional media (i.e. Cook 1989; Cook 1998; Kedrowski 1996; Page 1996) or "new
media" (i.e. Davis 1999; Davis and Owen 1998). In this dissertation, I try to break
this mold and examine how state legislators use both traditional and new media in
their jobs. Among my key findings regarding new media, I find that e-mail is
pervasive in state legislatures. Virtually all state legislators have access to e-mail. It
appears that the resources are present for e-mail to become an important new means
of communication in state legislatures.
E-Mail Is Used For More Than Just Constituency Contact
Earlier research has established that e-mail is becoming an important new
means of constituency contact (Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman 2001) but has
ignored other possible uses of e-mail. My evidence suggests that this is shortsighted.
While legislators use e-mail most often to communicate with constituents, e-mail is
also used to communicate with other actors including other legislators, government
organizations, etc. Although the use of e-mail for constituency contact is certainly
important, more research needs to be conducted about how e-mail is changing the
way legislators communicate with other policy actors.
There Is Little Evidence of a Digital Divide in the State Legislature
Previous research has suggested that frequent users of the Internet and e-mail
are more likely to be wealthy, urban, young and male. It seems that the broad trends
of a younger, urban cohort using e-mail are not found amongst legislators. While
male legislators are more likely to check their email frequently, other trends found in
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society are not found amongst legislators. This supports the work of Richardson,
Daugherty and Freeman (2001) who find little evidence of a systematic upper class
bias in determining which state legislators receive more constituency requests over email.
Web Pages Are An Underntilized Means of Communication in the State Legislature
I conclude that web pages have a much different presence in the state
legislature than they do in Congress. Indeed, most state legislators have little control
over the content and no control over the style of their web pages. The vast majority
of legislators web pages are not created by the legislator, but rather by support staff.
This finding is quite significant. It suggests that a potentially valuable resource (a
legislator's web page) is reduced to little more than a computer screen of contact
information and demographics. As Adler, Gent and Overmeyer ( 1998) observe, web
pages can be a relatively cost-effective means of demonstrating a "home style" over
the web. State legislators have been slow to recognize this. Adroit legislators in the
future will recognize the potentially valuable contribution of this new technology.
Implications

I stated early in this dissertation that these findings will have implications for our
understanding of how state legislators achieve their legislative goals as well as how
the process of representation works in the states. Below, I review how our knowledge
is applicable to these two areas
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What Does This Mean For Our Understanding of How State Legislators Achieve
Legislative Goals?
When Richard Fenno posited that legislators seek to achieve re-election, good
public policy and power inside the legislature, he concentrated on how legislators'
activities at home help them realize their goals (1978). In this dissertation, I take a
slightly different tack. Recognizing that the increasing professionalism of state
legislatures is resulting in legislators spending more time in the state capital, I posit
that state legislators often use media to achieve these goals. Specifically, I find that
legislators use media tactics as one way of reaching their triad of legislative goals.
While Fenno's work was certainly groundbreaking in its consideration of how
legislators' activities at home help achieve goals, too little work has been conducted
regarding how members use media to reach these goals-particularly in the state
legislature. In sum, my findings suggest that media tactics should be considered
alongside other means of achieving legislative goals. Using the media can be a way
for legislators to demonstrate a home style without actually going home. Any scholar
seeking to gain a full understanding of how legislators attain legislative goals should
look at both media tactics and traditional means of realizing legislative goals.
Scholars who discuss the impact of media on Congress and other political
institutions generally conclude that as media tactics become more important, political
parties (Wattenberg 1998) and traditional notions of seniority (Ranney 1983) become
less important. My data suggest that this is likely to occur in the state legislature, as
well. Indeed, John Bibby (1999) has suggested that political parties in the states have
declined in power in recent years. What does this mean for how legislators achieve
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their goals? First, by using media tactics, junior legislators will be able to bypass
legislative norms and garner influence in the legislature earlier than they would using
traditional means of legislating. Second, if parties continue to decrease in
importance, legislators will have a more difficult time forming coalitions and solving
collective action problems-some of the major functions of parties. In sum, if the use
of legislative tactics increases, political parties must change their role in order to
maintain power and influence in the states (Bibby 1999).
Although I have established that media are used in achieving legislative goals,
I have not discussed how this affects the outcomes of these goals. When legislators
use media tactics, they filter their message through an intermediary (the journalist).
As Cook (1988, 1998) and Zaller (2002) discuss, the politician's message is not
delivered unencumbered to the intended audience. Instead, the legislator's message is
altered by the journalist. While at times the final product will look similar to what the
legislator intends, it can often look far different. As Zaller (2002) notes, journalists,
politicians and the citizens all have different goals in the negotiation of
newsworthiness. What this means is that when communicating via media, politicians
trust the interpretation of a non-elected mediator, who is subject to the motives of the
journalism profession, rather than the motives of representative democracy. Chapter
4 demonstrated that slight changes in media content can significantly alter the
priorities, attitudes, opinions and choices of individuals. This process of filtering
communications can have deleterious effects on the legislator's ability to realize their
legislative goals. By choosing to communicate via media, legislators are gaining the
ability to reach a variety of audiences at one time. The tradeoff for this economical
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form of communication is that they lose some control over the message. Although it
is outside the scope of this dissertation to examine exactly what these consequences
are, certainly this is an area of inquiry worth exploring in future research.

What Does This Mean For Our Understanding of Representation in the States?
From Chapter 2, we learned that the media plays a vital role in two stages of
representation--communicating with constituents and policy responsiveness. So,
how do the findings presented here contribute further to our understanding of
representation?
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Alan Rosenthal fears an increase in media
tactics, polling and increased constituency contact has resulted in a "decline of
representative democracy." Thus, in Rosenthal's view, if state legislators frequently
use media tactics, this may hurt the system of representative democracy created by
the founders. My data inform Rosenthal's findings in two different ways. First, my
data suggest that state legislators do use media tactics. Certainly, this would trouble
Rosenthal. Further, I find that the frequency with which legislators use media tactics
varies tremendously by state-professional state legislatures using media tactics more
often. Thus, my findings suggest that Rosenthal's fears of a decline in representative
democracy are more salient in states with professional legislatures than in states that
employ citizen legislatures. Unfortunately, Rosenthal makes little distinction based
on the state context in his work. Surely, this is an important corrective to Rosenthal's
concerns. Looking to the future, recent findings suggest that more and more state
legislatures are professionalizing. As a result, I would expect that we will see a rise
in the use of media tactics, and by extension, a further decline in representative
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democracy. While it is outside of the scope of this study to determine if a decline in
representative democracy is truly negative (as Rosenthal believes), my findings do
suggest that Rosenthal is correct that we can expect to see a decline in representative
democracy.
While the above discussion is doubtless important, Rosenthal did not pen the
only work on legislative representation in the states. As such, next I will discuss
other possible implications for our understanding of representation. Most scholars
agree that representation depends on some form of communication between
legislators and their constituents. Moreover, this communication must be accurate.
In other words, the ideas, policy stances and priorities of the legislator must be
transmitted accurately to the constituent and vice-versa. Unfortunately, using
traditional media necessitates a "negotiation of newsworthiness" whereby the
legislator "negotiates" with the journalist over what will be covered and how it will
be portrayed (Cook 1989). The outcome of the negotiation is the news. Certainly,
this presents some problems for representation in the United States. If legislators use
media to communicate with constituents, their message will be filtered and altered.
The constituent's view of the legislator's activity will thus be altered in ways that
may not be consistent with the ideal of representation. In short, when legislators use
media as a means of communicating with constituents, representation is hurt.
Unfortunately, studies of representation have ignored this serious and inevitable
consequence of media politics in the United States. Likewise, as Chapter 6 discusses,
legislators depend on media content to know the opinion of their constituents (Herbst
1998). This too raises serious questions about representation. The media have well126

established bias built into the newsgathering process4 (Gans 1978). If legislators use
media to better understand public opinion, their view of their constituents' opinion
will be skewed in the direction of the media coverage, as legislators are not immune
from the consequences of agenda setting and framing discussed in Chapter 2. Again,
due to this process, representation will not occur as our founders envisioned it.
One way around some of these problems is to use computerized media.
Creating a web page is one way to reach constituents as well as a variety of other
groups with an unfiltered message. With web pages, there is no journalist to work
through. The message goes directly from the legislator to the public. While this may
create a new set of problems; used properly and responsibly, web pages and
computerized media provide a possible avenue to improve representation in the
United States. Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter 7, legislators do not generally
have control over the content or style of their web pages. Smart legislators will begin
to use web pages as a way to reach a variety of audiences. This will not only increase
the effectiveness of their communication campaigns, but also may work towards
better representation in the state legislature
A Connection to Turnout?

If the reader takes nothing else from this dissertation, she should realize that
media are often used by state legislators in the completion of their jobs. At the core is
a question left unaddressed-is this increasing reliance on the media positive for
democracy? In a series of articles, Alan Gerber and Donald Green (2000a; 2000b)
suggest that the decline in face-to-face contact between politicians and citizens is
Not bias in the liberal-conservative sense, but rather bias towards the status quo, bias towards
"official sources" and bias in the sense that every story must have "two sides."
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partially responsible for decreased voter turnout in the United States. Another recent
work suggests that decreased face-to-face contact between legislator and citizen
constitutes a primary means of political participation. When citizens are denied this
face-to-face contact, they are missing out on a key component of participation
(Szarawarski 1999). Together, these studies suggest that if politicians (including state
legislators) rely on media at the expense of face-to-face contact, turnout in the United
States will continue to drop. Likewise, a number of studies have suggested that faceto-face contact and personal ties are important in legislative decision-making.
(Arnold, Dean and Patterson 200 l; Calderia and Patterson 1987). All of this suggests
that there are significant effects of an increasingly depersonalized and media-reliant
legislature. Fortunately, for citizens of the United States, however, my findings do
not support these doom and gloom fears. While it is true that I do find that state
legislators use media, I do not find that they use media at the expense of traditional
means of completing their jobs. As I stated earlier, my data suggest that media tactics
augment, but do not replace traditional means of legislating. If legislators increase
their use of media tactics, this does not necessarily mean that we will see a decline in
face-to-face contact.

A Connection to Social Capital?
As I discussed above, media play a key role in state legislative politics.
Legislators use media both as a means of both disseminating information and gaining
information about public opinion. The previous section discussed how this may have
deleterious consequences for democracy in the form of decreased voter turnout.
Another related concern regards social capital. Social capital is defined as " ... [the]
128

features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1995: 67). The decline in
voter turnout, according to Robert Putnam is merely a symptom of a larger problemthe decline in social capital. Although the cause is far from certain (Uslaner 1998),
Putnam believes that most evidence points to the rise in television as the most direct
cause of the decline in social capital in America. Certainly, if state legislators are
using various forms of media as a means of communication, this could further
exacerbate the problems associated with declining social capital in America. A
decline in social capital could lead to a further decline in civic participation generally,
a decline in group membership, a decline in church attendance and a general decline
in the feeling of connectedness between citizens. Certainly, none of these are trivial
consequences. This discussion highlights the possibly deleterious effects that a
media-reliant legislature can have on a democratic polity.
Limitations
Although this dissertation has made a number of contributions to literature on state
legislatures and political communication, there are, as with any study, a number of
limitations. They are reviewed below.
Problems Inherent in Sampling
This study only considers evidence from three states. Although every effort
was made to ensure that these states were representative of the population of state
legislators across the country, it is entirely possible that legislators in California,
Georgia and Iowa are different than legislators in other states. Furthermore, although
respondents in these states do not differ from non-respondents demographically, they
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could differ in other ways. Although there is no way of testing for this, it is possible
that those who responded have a different attitude towards media tactics than
legislators who chose not to return the survey. Unfortunately, there is no way to
ensure that those who responded are similar to those who did not respond. In sum,
while I frequently suggest that my findings have implications for the universe of state
legislators, this claim must be treated with some care.

Problems Inherent in Survey Research
Survey research, although valuable, is haunted by problems. First, by
definition, survey research deals with perceptions rather than reality. Each question
in this survey asked legislators about their feelings towards using media, or asked
them to self-report how often they engage in certain activities. Certainly, there is
tremendous room for error here. It is possible that for a variety of reasons, legislators
did not answer questions truthfully. Extensive research has cited problems with
survey questions that have a socially desirable answer. Although no questions appear
to have problems with social desirability, there is simply no way of ensuring that
people are truthful with their answers.
Next, many questions asked legislators to place their answer on a scale (i.e.
strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree). Although these scales are
used frequently, there is no way to ensure that one legislator's answers will be
consistent with another's. In other words, there is no way to know if one legislator's
opinion of "disagree" is the same as another. Although these scales do provide a
rough indication of the intensity of a legislator's opinion, they are not perfect. The
results garnered from these questions should thus be treated with some care.
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Talk Radio?
Although I made every attempt to ask legislators about as many different
forms of media as possible, some were given short shrift. In particular, this study
does not adequately address talk radio. Talk radio marks an important and growing
means of political communication (Barker 1999; Cappella, Turow and Jamieson
1996; Hofstetter 1998). Talk radio can directly impact people's attitudes about
politics in a number of ways. First, talk radio can directly impact attitudes towards
specific political figures (Barker and Knight 2000). Scholars have found that talk
radio increases people's levels of information about politics (Hofstetter et. al 1999).
Alternatively, it can also increase misinformation (Hofstetter et. al 1999). Talk radio
can also create a new kind of social network (Barker 1998)-which in turn increases
the political participation of the listeners. Since appearing on talk radio costs the
legislator nothing other than time, and evidence demonstrates that listening to talk
radio can influence not only people's attitudes and opinions, but can also mobilize
people to act, it stands to reason that state legislators would see appearing on talk
radio as an effective means of reaching a politically interested public. Future studies
should address the role of talk radio in the state legislature.
While these limitations are worth considering, they do not imply that my
findings are unimportant. For instance, although there is no way to exclude the
problems inherent with survey research, conducting a survey can still be a useful way
to find out the opinions of a large number of people. As Babbie ( 1995:273) remarks,
"surveys are particularly useful in describing the characteristics of a large
population." Likewise, while it is a limitation of this study that I did not include
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questions about every medium, it would have been impossible to include questions on
each medium. Although the data are not perfect, they mark a considerable
improvement over the data that previously existed. Indeed, prior to this study we
knew virtually nothing about the relationship between state legislators and the media.
Furthermore, no extant dataset addresses the use of the media by state legislators.
Hopefully scholars will use these findings as a starting point of our question in our
understanding of the press-government relationship in the states. Future works
should consider other complimentary forms of data collection-including, but not
limited to face-to-face interviews and participant observation.
Directions For Future Research
As I indicated early in this study, there is no extant literature examining how state
legislators use media to achieve their goals. As a result, this study is primarily
descriptive. Since this research is only a first step, I now discuss some directions for
future research.
Journalists?
As Tim Cook (1988; 1998) suggests, the production of news is best
understood as a "negotiation of newsworthiness" between politician and reporter.
Likewise, Zaller (2002) suggests that it is the intersection of the divergent goals of
citizens, journalists and politicians that produces the final product of news. This
study has provided a glimpse of the negotiation in the states from the perspective of
the politician. Future studies should examine the negotiation from the perspective of
the journalist. If we can gain a better understanding of the perspective of the
politician and journalist, we will be able to a more complete understanding of the
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totality of the press-media connection in the states. Among the questions that should
be addressed include: how often are journalists approached by state legislators? How
do statehouse journalists view their role? Do they feel they are political actors? Do
they feel much pressure from editors regarding the content of their stories on state
politics? How much freedom do they have in deciding what stories to cover at the
statehouse? Some of these questions have been addressed in a rather dated look at
capital reporters in Washington (Hess 1981), but no one has conducted a large-scale
look at reporters in the states.

Advertisements
Although there is tremendous amount of literature examining the effects of
political advertisements (particularly negative advertisements) on the electorate
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Diamond and Bates 1992; Kahn and Kenney 1999;
Lau et. al 1999), a dearth of research has looked at state legislative candidates'
decision to advertise. Although their resources are more limited than politicians at
the national level, certainly state legislators advertise as well. This study does not
specifically address the resources state legislators put into mass media advertising.
This seems a natural direction for future research. Scholars should try to find out if
state legislator's attempts to advertise differ from those of their national counterparts
and if they do differ, how? By examining advertisements, we should be able to gain a
more complete understanding of how state legislators use both free and paid media.

Confimzing a Hypothesis: The Role of Resources
Chapter 5 suggests that as professionalism increases, so does a legislator's
propensity to use media tactics. Although the legislator's view of the effectiveness of
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media tactics may not change, the frequency with which she engages in these tactics
will change. In short, these findings suggest that resources matter. From this, I
hypothesize that as the resources afforded a politician increase, so does their
propensity to use media tactics. Certainly, this is a hypothesis worth testing with
more data and in more contexts. In particular, future studies should examine this
question using legislators from more states. By examining more states, researchers
will have more variation in resources among states. If the hypothesis holds, then as
professionalism increases, so should a legislator's propensity to use media. Likewise,
as professionalism (and therefore resources) decline, so should the frequency with
which legislators use media to achieve their goals.
This hypothesis should also be applicable to any level of government and any
political actor-keeping with Malcolm Jewell's suggestion that "the goal of political
science is to develop generalizations that are not limited to particular times and
places" (Jewell 1982:4). In other words, if this hypothesis is worthwhile, then it
should be applicable to the actions of many political actors-not just state legislators.
One logical place to test this hypothesis would therefore be in the context of the
Presidency. Presidents, like state legislators and members of Congress now have far
more resources at their disposal than ever before. If my hypothesis is correct, then as
Presidents' resources have increased, so have the frequency with which they use
media tactics. Likewise, this finding should translate to members of Congress,
members of the city council, mayors, governors and virtually any other political actor.
In short, this hypothesis could make a real contribution to our understanding of the
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relationship between politicians and the media, but it must be examined in multiple
contexts before it can be accepted.
State and Local Politics: A Research Agenda
I have repeatedly suggested that there is far too little work examining
relationship between state legislators and the media. Certainly, the same can be said
of other political actors in the states. For instance, while accounts of the President's
media activities have produced scores of scholarly works (Cook and Ragsdale 1998;
Kernell 1986; Paletz and Guthrie 1987; Smoller 1990; Tebbe! and Watts 1985),
considerably less time has been spent examining the press activities of the Governor.
Surely, this is an area ripe for research. Governors are increasingly powerful, both
within their own state and on the national scene (Dometrius 1999). Certainly, the
way in which Governors use the media to communicate is an area that is both
understudied and highly important. For instance, Minnesota Governor, Jesse Ventura
was able to ably use the media to get elected. Once in office, Ventura has been able
to use the media to help legislate-something an independent politician like Ventura
could have found quite difficult otherwise.
Scholars have also spent very little time examining the press activities of state
bureaucrats, members of the city council, mayors and a variety of other actors in state
and local government. In short, state politics has received renewed interest in recent
years. If we wish to obtain a complete understanding of how subnational government
works, we must consider the media. Likewise, if we wish to have a complete picture
of political communication in the United States, scholars must the press/government
connection at the sub-national level.
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Applying a Theoretical Framework
As I have stated throughout this work, we know virtually nothing about the
relationship between state legislators and the media. Likewise, there are no
established theories of political communication to test. As a result, this dissertation
has laid a descriptive foundation from which scholars can proceed. While description
is a necessary step on the way to theory development, description cannot be the mark
of research on state legislators and the media. Scholars must look to see what extant
theoretical frameworks can help move past descriptive research on state legislators
and the media. Although research in political communication has been notable for
the absence of a unifying theory, there are two emerging possibilities that could help
explain the relationship between politicians and the media in the United States.
First, John Zaller has recently attempted to apply a rational choice framework
to understanding political communication in the United States (Zaller 2002). Zaller
posits that the relationship between politicians, journalists and citizens can best be
understood under the rubric of rational choice theory. According to Zaller, each actor
is pursuing her own rational ends. Politicians seek to receive the best media coverage
possible. Journalists want to be able to exercise their ')ournalistic voice" at the same
time they want to get big audiences-although they value the former much more than
the latter. Finally, the public wants to be able to "monitor politics and hold
politicians accountable with minimal effort" (Zaller 2002: 1-2). In Zaller's view, it is
the convergence of these three interests that produces the media politics seen today.
While Zaller's book focuses on presidential selection, certainly his framework could
be applied to our understanding of the relationship between the media and the state
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legislature. Future works should consider applying this rational choice framework to
the relationship between state legislators, journalists and the public.
Alternately, scholars could apply a theory borrowed from cognitive
psychology-prospect theory. While many are not willing to accept rational choice's
emphasis on rational, goal seeking behavior, prospect theory modifies the consistently
rational behavior assumed by rational choice theory. Prospect theory argues that
individuals will act differently in different situations. Specifically, prospect theory
posits that individuals receive diminishing value from continually increasing gains.
Conversely, individuals feel losses more strenuously than gains. So, in practice, "the
sting of loss is more acute than is the enjoyment derived from an equal gain"
(Berejekian 1997:790). Although this framework has never been applied to political
communication, it seems that it could help illuminate why political actors and
journalists act differently in different situations. Specifically, prospect theory would
suggest that journalists do not always use the same means to gather stories. When
journalists have little information (and are thus in a "losses frame"), they would be
willing to engage in riskier behavior-including accepting a politician's press
releases and statements with less filtering. When they have a lot of information (and
are thus in a "gains frame"), they will be less willing to help the politician reach her
goal of publicity. Likewise, when a state legislator is in a losses frame (losing on a
key piece of legislation, or losing in the polls for the next election), she is more likely
to engage in risky behavior and actively seek media coverage-regardless of the
outcome.
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Certainly, these are not the only two theoretical frameworks that could be
applied to our understanding of state legislators and the media. Nonetheless, they
provide a brief glimpse of two particularly promising theories that could be applied to
the subject. Future studies should engage in more explicit theory testing and theory
building to see whether rational choice or prospect theory can illuminate more of our
understanding of how the relationship between state legislators and the media takes
place.
Conclusion
The relationship between media and the state legislature has been almost universally
ignored in the scholarly literature. This dissertation provides a first step toward
understanding how media have altered decision-making and behavior in the state
legislature. Its results have direct implications for representation and legislative
behavior in the states. Furthermore, the resource definition of media entrepreneurship
provided here provides an intuitively appealing hypothesis ready to be tested at other
levels of government. If this dissertation provides nothing else, it should demonstrate
conclusively that media are important in state legislative politics. Scholars should
recognize this and begin to explore further the ins and outs of this relationship.
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Table 1: Comparing Validity in Research Designs
Most Similar Systems

Most Different Systems

Internal Validity

High

Low

External Validity

Low

High
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Table 2: Characteristics of Sampled States
Professionalism
Score, rank 8

Political Culture 6

Policy
Liberalismc

California

.900, 1/50

Individualistic/moralistic

1.49

Georgia

.136. 44/50

Traditionalistic

.44

Iowa

.238, 27/50

Moralistic/individualistic

-1.04

State

a= King (2000)
b= Elazar ( 1966)
c= Erikson, Wright and Mciver (1993)
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Table 3: Comparing the Sample to the Population
California

Georgia

Iowa

Po2ulation

Sam2Ie

Po2ulation

Sam2le

Po2ulation

Sam2le

Male

75%

75%

80%

77%

80%

78%

Democrat

63%

58%

58%

57%

41%

32%

Upper House

33%

32%

24%

22%

33%

35%
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THE MEDIA ENTREPRENEUR
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Figure 1: The Enterprise Process 1
1

Adapted from Kedrowski ( 1996: 197)
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Table 4: Percent of Legislators That Agree or Strongly Agree With the Following Statements
Question

CA

GA

IA

All States
Combined

1) Members often solicit media exposure as a way to

100%

79%

90%

87%

2) Soliciting media exposure is an effective way to put
an issue on the legislative agenda

94%

65%

73%

74%

3) Media exposure is an effective way to convince
other legislators in both chambers to support policy
proposals

76%

50%

51%

56%

4) Media exposure is an effective way to stimulate
discussion on policy alternatives and issues among
executive branch officials

94%

72%

71%

76%

34

68

67

179

stimulate discussion about policy proposals

-J
0

N=

Table 5: Frequency Legislators Engage in Various Activities
All States
Median
(Mean)

CA
Median
(Mean)

GA
Median
(Mean)

IA
Median
(Mean)

Contacting Other Legislators
Directly

4
(3.7)

4
(3.8)

4
(3.7)

4
(3.8)

Proposing Legislation

3
(3.4)

4
(3.7)

3
(3 .4)

Contacting Government
Agencies

3
(3.2)

3
(3.3)

4
(3 .4)
...

.,

3

(3.3)

(3 .3)

Contacting the Governor's
Office

3
(2.9)

3
(3.1)

3
(3.1)

(2.8)

Speaking on the floor

3
(3.1)

3
(3 .3)

3
(3.2)

3
(3.2)

Meeting with Lobbyists

4
(3.5)

4
(3.7)

(3.4)

4
(3.7)

4
(3.5)

4
(3.6)

3
(3.3)

4
(3.7)

Appearing on TV news

2
(2.3)

3
(2.8)

2
(2.3)

2
(2.3)

Writing op-eds

3
(2.7)

3
(3 .3)

3
(2.5)

3
(2.8)

Issuing press releases

3
(3.2)

3
(3.7)

3
(3.2)

3
(3.1)

Appearing on public access

2
(2.2)

4
(2.8)

2
(2.3)

2
(2.0)

Traditional Tactics

Meeting with party caucus

.,...

.,...

Media Tactics

TV

4=Frequently; 3= Occasionally; 2=Rarely; I =Never
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Table 6: Perceived Effectiveness of Various Activities
All States
Median
(Mean)

CA
Median

GA
Median

IA
Median

Contacting Other Legislators
Directly

2
(2.5)

2
(2.4)

2
(2.5)

3
(2.7)

Proposing Legislation

3
(2.9)

3
(2.9)

3
(2.9)

3
(3.1)

Contacting Government
Agencies

3
(3.2)

3
(3.2)

3
(3.2)

3
(3.3)

Contacting the Governor's
Office

3
(3.3)

3
(3.2)

3
(3.2)

4
(3.5)

Speaking on the floor

3
(3.3)

4

(3.7)

3
(3.1)

3
(3.4)

Meeting with Lobbyists

3
(3.0)

3
(3.1)

3
(3.0)

3
(3.1)

Meeting with party caucus

3
(3.0)

3
(3.1)

3
(3.3)

3
(2.9)

4

3
(3.3)

3
(3.3)

(3.3)

Traditional Tactics

Media Tactics
Appearing on TV news

(3.2)
Writing op-eds
Issuing press releases

4

4

4

4

(3.4)

(3.5)

(3.5)

(3.5)

4

3
(3.3)

3
(3.4)

(3.5)

4

4

(3.4)

(3.6)

4
(3.4)

(3.4)

(3.3)
Appearing on public access
TV

4

4= Very Effective; 3= Effective; 2= Somewhat Effective; I= Not Effective
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Table 7: OLS Regression on Tn~es of Media Activities

Constant

-

All States
B
(SE)
Effectiveness
Freguency
11.8**
l0.4**
(1.77)
(.1.06)

CA
B
(SE)
Effectiveness
Freguency
11.65*
11.53**
(4.59)
(2.83)

GA
B
(SE)
Effectiveness
Freguency
12.29
9.95**
(2.9)
(2.09)

IA
B
(SE)
Freguency Effectiveness
12.01
11.76
( 1.15)
(2.45)

Media
Market

.01
(.019)

-.01
(.03)

-.01
(.02)

-.01
(.04)

-.01
(.07)

-.01
(.09)

.04
(.04)

-.05
(.09)

% Vote

-.01
(.01)

.01
(.01)

.03
(.03)

.06
(.04)

-.02
(.02)

-.02
(.02)

-.01
(.01)

-.03
(.02)

Urban

.05
(.147)

-.21
(.25)

-.04
(.49)

-1.6*
(.79)

.14
(.28)

.33
(.39)

-.71
(.46)

-.15
(.98)

Age

.30
(.22)

.04
(.36)

.34
(.54)

-.32
(.90)

.94*
(.41)

.67
(.57)

-.47
(.28)

-.55
(.58)

Leader

.32
(.36)

.28
(.60)

-.95
( 1.17)

3.56
(1.9)

.98
(.62)

-.24
(.87)

-.20
(.45)

(.96)

Male

-.17
(.38)

-1.6**
(.63)

-.27
(.92)

-.90
( 1.49)

-.25
(.71)

-1.71
(.98)

-.03
(.49)

-1.77
(1.04)

Majority
Party

-.55
(.33)

-.57
(.55)

-.85
(.93)

-.81
( 1.51)

-.55
(.63)

-.16
(.89)

-.71
(.46)

-.55
(.58)

California

2.31 **
(.54)

1.3
(.89)

.19

.13

.10

.11

-...J
~

.23

Iowa

.14
.01
(.37)
(.62)
R~
.25
.07
.34
.17
*Statistically significant at 0.05; **Statistically significant at 0.0 l.

Table 8: Media in the Policy Process

"The media may be used at various stages in the legislative process. How often do
you solicit media attention for each of the following stages of the policy process?
(4=frequently; I =never)
Mean Score

Median Score

N

To raise awareness of a problem

2.93

3.0
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To inform and influence interest groups

2.90

3.0

186

To frame the terms of debate

2.67

3.0

184

To find support for a floor vote

2.57

3.0

185

To move a bill through committee

2.53

3.0

187

To respond to proposals from the
governor

2.51

3.0

186

To respond to decisions and proposals
from government agencies

2.49

2.0

187

Stage in the PolicI Process
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Table 9: Reported Use of Various Media Sources

When you are seeking information regarding public policy, how often do you consult
each of the following sources? (4=frequently; I =never)
Mean Score

Median Score

N

Newspaper(s) in district

3.5

4.0

187

Local newscasts in district

3.3

3.0

188

Paper of record in state capital

3.0

3.0

184

Local newscasts in the state
capital

2.8

3.0

188

Specialized trade publications
and newsletters

2.8

3.0

187

The Internet

2.6

3.0

188

Alternative newspaper in state
capital

2.6

2.0

186

Local public access cable

2.3

2.0

187

CNN

2.3

2.0

189

National Public Radio

2.2

2.0

187

Wall Street Journal

1.9

2.0

188

Weekly magazines (Time,
Newsweek)

1.9

2.0

187

New York Times

1.7

2.0

188

Washington Post

1.6

1.0

187

Christian Science Monitor

1.5

1.0

187

News Source
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Table 10: OLS Regression on Legislator Use of Media as a Source of Policy Information

Variable

All Media

Print Media

TV

NPR

Internet

Constant

3.043 ***
(.568)

2.526***
(.609)

3.112***
(.785)

3.171***
(1.114)

3.774***
(1.252)

Entrepreneurship

.105 **
(.053)

.095*
(.057)

.216***
(.072)

.014
(.026)

.035
(.029)

Georgia

-.247**
(.117)

-.166
(.125)

-.091
(.159)

-.544**
(.225)

-.486*
(.253)

Iowa

-.246**
(.119)

-.160
(.127)

-.183
(.163)

-.146
(.231)

-.715***
(.261)

District Income

-.001
(.000)

.001
(.000)

-.001 ***
(.000)

.001 *
(.000)

.001
(.000)

Democrat

.281 ***
(.090

.237**
(.096)

.291 **
(.123)

.917***
(.175)

-.003
(.196)

Upper House

-.057
(.086)

-.058
(.092)

-.049
(.119)

.173
(.168)

-.083
(.189)

Age

.001
(.000)

-.003
(.000)

.001
(.000)

.001
(.000)

.001
(.001)

Male

-.193*
(.092)

-.098
(.106)

-.319**
(.129)

-.485***
(.186)

-.103
(.206)

.029
(.125)
.238
148
4.833***

-.176
(.176)
.274
150
5.908***

-.236
(.199)
.114
150
2.010***

-.022
.037
(.092)
(.098)
.233
.143
R
141
144
N
4.466***
2.503***
F
Number in parentheses is standard error.
***=p<.01
**=p<.05
*=p<.1
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Figure 4: Who do you use e-mail to communicate with?
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November 16, 1999

Dear Legislator,
I am a graduate student in political science at the University of Tennessee who is
specializing in the study of state legislatures. I need your help by filling out the
enclosed survey questionnaire regarding media use by state legislators. Little is
known about the ways in which state legislators use the media to advance their policy
goals and stances. In order to add to the knowledge base in political science and
communications, I am conducting a study about the frequency with which state
legislators use the media as well as the different ways and times in which this occurs.
Legislators in California, Iowa, Georgia and Pennsylvania have been chosen to
participate in this survey. Due to the relatively small number of states being
surveyed, your participation is extremely important. You will be representing many
legislators in states similar to your own.
Please take a few moments to complete the questionnaire and return it in the enclosed
self-addressed stamped envelope. It would be very helpful to have your completed
questionnaire returned as soon as possible.

Your responses are confidential. No names or individual information will be
released or used in this study. If you have any questions please call me at (423)
521-7311 or e-mail me at cooper23@utk.edu. Thank you very much for your
participation

Sincerely,

Christopher A. Cooper
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May 24, 2000

Dear Legislator:

About two months ago I wrote to you seeking your opinion on media use in the state
legislature. As of today I have not yet received your completed questionnaire.
I am writing to you again because of the significance each questionnaire has to the
usefulness of this study. Legislators in Iowa, Georgia and California have been
chosen for this study. In order for the results of this study to be truly representative of
the opinions of all legislators, it is essential that each person in the sample return their
questionnaire.
In the event that your questionnaire has been misplaced, a replacement is enclosed.

If you have already returned your questionnaire, please disregard this letter. Thank
you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Christopher A. Cooper
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MEDIA USE IN THE STA TE LEGISLATURE
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. This survey should take no longer than 5-10 minutes to
complete. All thoughts and comments are welcome. Please feel free to attach any additional pages as
necessary.

i. Are you a:
_ _ Legislator
Staff Member

➔

How long have you worked for your current employer? _ _ _ __

SECTION I
Please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following
statements.

1.

Members of the state legislature often solicit media exposure (i.e. interviews, talk show
appearances, op-eds, press releases, etc.) as a way to stimulate discussion about policy
proposals.
Strongly agree

2.

Strongly Disagree

Don't Know

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Don't Know

Media exposure is an effective way to convince other legislators in both chambers to support
policy proposals.
Strongly Agree

4.

Disagree

Soliciting media exposure is not a particularly effective way to put an issue on the legislative
agenda.
Strongly Agree

3.

Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Don't Know

Media exposure is an effective way to stimulate discussion on policy alternatives and issues
among executive branch officials.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Don't Know

SECTION II
S.

Legislators may engage in a variety of activities in order to achieve their public policy goals.
Please indicate how often you engage each of the following activities.
Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

b. Appearing on television news programs Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

c. Proposing legislation

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

d. Writing op-ed articles

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

a. Contacting other legislators directly
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e. Contacting governmental agencies

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

f. Issuing press releases

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

g. Contacting the governor's office

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

h. Appearing on public access television

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

i. Speaking on the floor

Frequently

Occasionally

j. Meeting with lobbyists

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

k. Meeting with party caucus

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

I. Other (please specify)

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

SECTION III
6. In your opinion, what is the relative effectiveness of each of the following activities for
furthering
your policy goals?
Please evaluate according to the following scale:
Not Effective

a.

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Contacting other legislators directly
Not Effective

b.

Somewhat Effective

Somewhat Effective

Appearing on television news programs
Not Effective

Somewhat Effective

c. Proposing legislation
Not Effective

Somewhat Effective

d. Writing op-ed articles
Not Effective

e.

Somewhat Effective

Contacting governmental agencies
Not Effective

Somewhat Effective
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f.

Issuing press releases
Not Effective

Somewhat Effective

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

g. Contacting the governor's office
Somewhat Effective
Not Effective
h. Appearing on public access television
Not Effective

Somewhat Effective

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

Effective

Very Effective

No Opinion

i. Speaking on the floor

Not Effective

Somewhat Effective

j. Meeting with lobbyists
Not Effective

Somewhat Effective

k. Meeting with party caucus
Not Effective

Somewhat Effective

I. Other (please specify)

Not Effective

Somewhat Effective

SECTION III
7.

Many members of the state legislature use strategies such as writing op-ed articles and
conducting interviews with reporters to publicize their ideas and policy positions. In your
opinion, who are these members trying to reach through these efforts? (Check all that
apply)
_ _Colleagues in their own party
_ _Colleagues in the other party
_ _Legislative staff
_ _Their party leadership
_ _ Executives in state agencies
_ _The governor's office
_ _ Interest groups
Other media
Constituents
_ _The public outside their constituency
_ _Other (please specify) _ _ _ _ _ __
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8.

The media may be used at various stages in the legislative process. How often do you
solicit media attention for each of the following stages of the policy process?
a.

To raise awareness of a problem (to place an item on the agenda)

Frequently
b.

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

To respond to proposals from the governor

Frequently
d.

e.

Occasionally

To respond to decisions and proposals from government agencies

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

To move a bill through committee

Frequently
f.

Occasionally

To find support for a floor vote

Frequently
g.

h.

Occasionally

To inform and influence interest groups

Frequently

Occasionally

Other (please specify) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Frequently
9.

Rarely

To frame the terms of debate

Frequently
c.

Occasionally

Occasionally

When you are seeking information regarding public policy, how often do you consult each
of the following sources?

i. Print Media
a.

Paper of record in the state capital

Frequently
b.

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

Newspaper(s) in your district

Frequently
d.

Rarely

Alternative newspaper in the state capital

Frequently
c.

Occasionally

Occasionally

Specialized trade publications and newsletters

Frequently

Occasionally
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e.

Wall Street Journal

Frequently
f.

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Frequently

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

Rarely

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

Occasionally

Rarely

Never

New York Times

Frequently
g.

Washington Post

Frequently
h.

Christian Science Monitor

Frequently
i.

Weekly newsmagazines (e.g. Time, Newsweek)

Frequently
j.

Other (please specify)

Frequently
ii. Electronic media
a.

b.

c.

National Public Radio

CNN

Local newscasts in the state capital

Frequently
d.

Local newscasts in your district

Frequently
e.

The Internet

Frequently
g.

Occasionally

Local public access television

Frequently
f.

Occasionally

Other (please specify)

Frequently
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SECTION IV
The following section refers to legislator use of computer technology.
10. Do you have an e-mail account?
__ Yes (If yes, continue with item 11)
__ No (Ifno, please skip to item 13)

11. In an average week, how often do you check your e-mail?
_ _ More than once a day
_ _ Once a day
_ _ Every other day
Once a week
Less than once a week
12. Who do you use e-mail to communicate with? (check all that apply)
Constituents
_ _Other legislators
_ _Government agencies
Governor's office
_ _ Party leaders
Personal use
_ _Other (please specify) _ _ _ _ __

13. Many legislators have web pages to communicate information about themselves, their
district and their policy goals. Do you have a web page associated with your job as
legislator?
_ _Yes (If yes, please continue with item 14)
_ _No (lfno, please skip to item 16)

14. How often is your web page updated?
_ _Daily
__ Weekly
__Monthly
_ _Less than monthly

15. Who are you trying to reach with your web page? (Check all that apply)
Constituents
- ~Other legislators
__Government agencies
Governor's office
_ _Party leaders
__Other (please specify)_ _ _ __
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SECTIONV
The final set of questions refers to the legislator's background. (If you are staff, please answer
these questions in reference to the legislator for whom you work).
16. In what year were you born?

17. What is your primary occupation?

18. How would you describe your legislative district? (Check all that apply)
_ _There is a large city (more than I 00,000 people in it)
_ _ Urban but no cities over I 00,000
A mixture of urban and rural
_ _Mostly rural
_ _Mostly suburban

19. Are you a: (check all that apply)
_ _ Member of the party leadership
_ _Committee chair or ranking committee member
_ _ Subcommittee chair or ranking subcommittee member

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

If you have any additional comments, please attach a separate sheet of paper. If you
would like to receive a copy of the results of this survey, please include your name
and address in the space below.
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APPENDIXC
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A NOTE ON ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION

Throughout this work, I make frequent use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression. In this appendix, I briefly describe what regression means and how OLS
regression differs from other forms of regression.
Regression is "a statistical method that allows you to draw the line of best fit
and to make predictions ... " (Spatz 1993: 81). In its most basic form, regression is
concerned with the effect of one independent or causal variable on another dependent
variable. This is called bivariate regression. Unfortunately, "since most variables
have more than one cause, it is necessary to use multiple regression ... , assuming that
measures of more than one cause are available. Multiple regression is particularly
appropriate when the causes (independent variables) are intercorrelated, which again
is usually the case" (McClendon 1994: 60). Throughout this dissertation, I am mostly
interested in the effect of a number of different independent variables on one
dependent variable, controlling for other causes. Multiple regression is the best tool
to find out the dynamics of such a relationship.
There are a number of different forms of regression, and each comes with its
own assumptions. OLS regression assumes homoscedasticity, or equal variance, no
autocorrelation, no specification bias or error, and no perfect multicollinearity. If
these conditions are satisfied, one may use OLS regression (Gujarati 1995). None of
the models in this work appear to violate these assumptions.

190

VITA

Christopher Alan Cooper was born in Greenville, South Carolina on August 12, 1975.
He attended public schools in South Carolina, and later in Springfield, Virginia.
Chris graduated from West Springfield High School in May 1993. In 1997, he
received his B.A. from Winthrop University with a double major in Political Science
and Sociology. In the fall of 1997, he entered the graduate program in Political
Science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, where he received his M.A. in
1999 and his PhD in 2002.
While at UTK, he received a number of grants, including the Yates
Dissertation Fellowship during the academic year 2001-2002.

His research has

appeared in Social Science Quarterly, State and Local Government Review, State
Politics and Policy Quarterly and in edited volumes.

191

